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INTRODUCTION 
The nationalization of the petroleum industry in Mexico 
in 1938 was an event which attracted world-wide attention. 
In particular it was a mat~er of deep concern in the United 
s tates, Britain and Mexico and as a result a vast body of 
literature appeared, much of it tendentious, dealing with 
the legal, diplomatic, historic, sociGlogical and economic 
aspects of the expropriation of the foreign-owned petroleum 
companies. 
More than a dozen years have passed since Mexico 
1 nationalized her petroleum industry. During this period 
' Mexico struggled with internal and external problems of 
great magnitude in its effort to assimilate the newly ac-
' quired petroleum industry into the national economy and to 
· manage the p~oduction and distribution of petroleum 
efficiently. 
Bnough time has elapsed since the expropriation to 
warrant a study which would examine the process of assimi-
lation and its results. No full scale study of this kind 
has thus far been made to the knowledge of the writer. 
I 
p 
'I Hence, 1
1 
II 
II 
the present thesis attempts to fill this gap within the 
II ,, 
limits set by a master's dissertation and the availability 
' of materials at Boston University and other library sources 
in the greater Boston area. 
_IL__ -
II 
I 
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The study is partly chronological and partly topical. 
1 The first three chapters are primarily chronological. They 
relate t h e main events leading to expropriation, the domestic 
and international repercussions immediately following this 
event, the organization of Pemex, the official Mexican 
government petroleum agency, the impact of W'orld \1ar II on 
its operations and the technological, political and labor 
relations problems of this agency until its reorganization 
and stabilization in 1947. 
The topical treatme:ut covers the problems and develop-
ment of: 1) petroleum production, including refining; 2) 
petroleum consumption and its relationship t.o industrial 
development,. production of natural gas, and the expor•ting and 
importing of petroleum products; 3) equipment and techno-
logical development, including transportation facilities; 
'' 4) the return of foreign capital and the new condi tions 
imposed on private investment in petroleum; and 5) petrole-
um fields, reserves and explorations. 
a great variety of sources were consulted for general 
orientation and specific data. In addition to the standard 
works, both Mexican and American, dealing with the 
expropriation itself, general studies concerning industrial 
development in Mexico and a large body of periodical 
literature, both Mexican and A.merican, were consulted. Of 
particular importauce have been the American trade journals 
-=--~-,,.========~====~==========~===========================================*========== 
II 
,, 
I 
II 
which have f urnished invaluable data. 
xii !I 
II 
II The thesis has been conceived primarily as a descrip-
tive study. No attempt has been made to enter into the 
controversy with respect to the justification or lack of it, 
for the expropriation of the foreign oil companies. Only in 
I; the concluding chapter is an attempt made to estimate the 
effectiveness of the petroleum operations under Mexican 
government management. 
In the preparation of this thesis the au thor is grea t ,ly 
indebted to Professor Maurice Halperin, chairman of the 
Department of Latin American Regional Studies at Boston 
,~ University, for his guidance, in the preparation of the 
thesis and constructive criticism of the manuscript as each 
chapter was written. Grateful acknowledgement is made to 
' Professor Everett J. Burtt of Boston University for his 
valuable advice on many of the economic proble1ns dealt with. 
1\ 
The author wishes to thank Mr. Gordon Duke, representa-
/ 
tive of Southeastern de Mexico, for his kindness in forward-
ing vital information concerning the return of foreign capital 
for the development of the Mexican petroleum industry. 
I am especially pleased to acknowledge my indebtedness 
to my wife Ann Gramolini for her patient understanding and 
encouragement, and to my daughter Stephanie for relinquishing 
many hours of playful companionship with her father so that 
the writing of the thesis could be accomplished. 
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Finally, I owe special thanks to the United States 'I 
i· 
lj Government for providing the means, through Public Law 346, 
II 
I 
II 
I 
I 
which have made it possible for me to pursue graduate study 
and to prepare this dissertation as part of my graduate 
program. 
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CHAPTER I 
MEXICAN Pli!TROLEUM BEFORE NATIONALIZATION 
Petroleum was apparently known to the aboriginal inhabi-
tants of Mexico long before the Spanish conquest. Hubert 
Herring in his work Mexico The Making of a Modern Nation, gives 
a good description of the early use of petroleum: 
I Fray Bernardino de Sahagun, sixteenth century 
missionary, reported that the Aztecs skimmed petroleum 
from. shallow ocean inlets, and · offered it as a sacrifice 
to the gods, as medicine to the sick. The Aztecs called 
it Chapuputli. To t~is day Mexican chauffeurs call 
lubricating oil Cha~ote. · The Franciscan friar trans-
lated the 1word tast~per?umeada humeante. Neither Aztecs 
nor Sahagun cou d know what mingled joy and sorrow this 
•smoking perfumed paste• would bring dwellers in the 
land of Moctezuma. 1 
The first commercial exploitation of petroleum in Mexico 
was attempted by American and English companies around 1864 and 
a later one in 1880 but both were unsuccessful. Another attempt 
was made by the Mexican Oil Corporation and the London Oil 
Trust, both English firms, but they failed after a loss of some 
160,000 pounds sterling. 
Rise of the Petroleum Industry 
The first successful wells were developed from 1901 to 
1910 when American and English capital returned after first 
attempts had failed. Edward L. Doheny and his associates 
formed the Mexican Petroleum Company of California and made 
sporadic progress at first. Their first success was at Cerro 
de la Pez and their yie~d for nine years was approximately 
2 
3,500,000 barrels. Later short-lived wells were brought in. 
The first major oil field was discovered in 1910 by the Aguila 
Company (Cawdroy), an English firm. This firm brought in the 
famous Portrero del Llano number four well which produced 
100,000 barrels of crude petroleum daily. Over 100,000,000 
barrels were obtained from this well up to December, 1918 
when salt water filtered in to ruin it. The discovery of 
this well encouraged exploration activities in this section 
of Mexico and this area became known as the Golden Lane 
2 fields. 
Progress in Mexican exploitation at first was slow 
because of the great financial risks involved. Almost all 
the money invested was by foreign companies. From 1912 on, 
petroleum production increased at a tremendous rate with more 
than twenty-five American companies moving into Mexico. 
Mexican petroleum production was greatly stimulated by other 
industrial developments. Locomotives, ships and factories 
were beginning to convert to oil. For exrunple, in the period 
from 1922 to 1935 coal consumption on ships throughout the 
world declined approximately 25 per cent while that of pe-
3 troleum increased approximately 90 per cent. 
Despite these new demands for petroleum Mexico would 
not have reached such high production figures as she did had 
it not been for the first World ~~ar. The war brought Mexico 
close to the top of the petroleum producing nations. 
Mexican production reached its peak in 1921 when she produced 
550,000 barrels daily. 
The high rate o:f production of the Mexican fields was 
bound to fall. The terrific pace set by the new demands 
could not be maintained unless new fields were opened. The 
lack of foresight or reluctance to use more capital by the 
oil companies resulted in an unfavorable situation. The high 
flush production, the early invasion of ~salt water, govern-
ment taxes and government restrictions all led to a reduction 
of 50 per cent in production by 1926. The political aspects 
of this reduction in production will be discussed later. 
Role of the United states in Mexico's Great ' Oil Period 
---
American interests played a big part in the tremendous 
rise of production and the subsequent fall. The following 
table shows clearly the large role played by american capital. 
TABLE I 
Al\lliRI CAN BHAR.h: OF Ml:::X: ICAN OIL PRODUCTION 4 
(In Barrels Daily) 
Year Production 
' 
American Owned Per cent 
Production Aillerican 
OWned 
1912 45,200 25,900 57.3 
1913 70,400 40,300 57.2 
1914 71,900 41,200 57.3 
1915 90,200 51,600 57.2 
1916 102,300 58,600 57.3 
1917 151,900 99,500 65.6 
1918 175,900 124,800 70.9 
1919 253,300 187,900 74.2 
1920 445,500 320,800 72.0 
1921 549,500 401.900 73.1 
1922 508,500 404,200 79.5 
3 
By 1934, of the total investment in Mexican petroleum 52 per 
cent was American, 46 per cent English and Dutch although in 
1938 when the expropriation occured the relative positions 
had changed with the British and Dutch investments calculated 
at more than 50 per cent of the total foreign petroleum 
investment. 
n{az ~ the Petroleum Companies 
How did these foreign companies become established in 
Mexico? Most of the foreign concerns entered Mexico during 
the regime of President Porfirio D{az. He gave generous 
concessions not only in petroleum but in other fields as 
well. During Dlaz's regime two men dominated Mexican pe-
troleum production. Sir Weetman Pearson, an Englishman, 
encouraged by D!az, produced 58 per cent of the national 
petroleum output by 1910. The other man, Edward L. Dohney, 
obtained enough concessions to be able to produce 42 per 
cent of the national output by 1910. These two men laid the 
foundation of the oil industry of Mexico which finally fell 
into the hands of the Standard Oil Group and the Dutch Shell 
interests. 5 These oil concessions were granted on very 
liberal terms. The concessions in turn provided nlaz with 
additional revenue in the for.m of royalties, thus helping 
him to stay in power. The oil companies paid the prevailing 
low wages of the time. Thus, the arrangement between the 
government of nlaz and the oil concerns was mutually 
4 
!. 
satisfactory. 
The few existing laws or codes concerning petroleum 
were in favor of this influx of foreign capital. Up to the 
fall of the n!az regime there were the four following codes 
or laws concerning petroleum: 
1. The Mexican Constitution of 1857, technically in force 
until May 1, 1917, made no reference to petroleum. Therefore 
it placed no legal restriction on the n!az type of contract. 
2. The Mining Code of November 22, 1884 gave owners of the 
land exclusive ownership of all petroleum deposits with the 
rights to develop them. 
3. The Mineral Law of June 4~ 1892 also gave the land owner 
the right to exploit the subsoil. 
4. The Mineral Law of November 25~ 1909 stated that surface 
rights carried with them subsoil rights. 6 . 
The regime of Porfirio n!az thus had ample legal 
grounds to penait petrpleum development by private capital, 
domestic or foreign. Since domestic capital was insufficient 
and lacked the necessary enterprise, foreign capital had the 
field to itself. However during the years from 1900 to 
1910, other developments, particularly the pressure from the 
landless masses~ was to result in the Mexican Revolution of 
1910 and bring great changes affecting the status of the oil 
companies. 
5 
The Revolution 
After the overthrow of Porfirio n!az in 19101 there 
was a conflict between three forces: 1) the Indian or 
mestizo masses who were clamoring for land; 2) the small 
Creole aristocracy which had prospered under n!az; and 
finally, 3) a rising middle class which supplied the revo-
lutionary leadership. The middle class resented the draining 
of the national wealth by foreigners. It raised the slogan 
of uMexico for the Mexicans 11 • Each of these forces fought 
for its interests and in the process Mexico was torn with 
strife, with the masses bearing the brunt of the turmoil. 
The ten years after nfaz 1 s overthrow, from 1910 to 1920, was 
the violent phase of the revolution. It was a period of 
destruction and slaughter, but out of it there emerged a 
profound change. 'l'he n!az oligarchy and the landed aris-
tocracy were largely eliminated. Land was returned to the 
peasants. The middle ~lass was now the important element in 
the new Mexican government. 
Despite the change of government in Mexico, foreign 
interests still had a strong position in the Mexican ~conomy. 
One of their main holdings was ~l the petroleum industry. 
Foreign companies were thus a constant reminder of the past. 
They recalled the n!az regime and all it stood for. Any 
political aspirant always attacked the foreign companies and 
he was sure to win public applause. The foreign companies 
6 
apparently failed to appreciate the strength of this latent 
hatred on the part of the Mexican people who, irrespective 
of the facts, blamed all of Mexico's troubles on them. The 
Mexicans felt the foreign concerns had played politics and 
had a contempt for Mexican institutions. Rnether or not the 
Mexicans were justified in this attitude is not our concern 
in this paper. What is of importance is the fact that this 
7 is the way they felt. 
Post-Revolutionary Period 
President Venustiano Carran:z.a, the first revolution-
ary leader to provide a relatively stable government, gave 
Mexico a constitution on February 5, 1917. Under Article 27 
of this constitution, Mexico laid the legal groundwork by 
virtue of which the foreigners would be expelled twenty-one 
years later. The sections of Article 27 that concern us are 
as follows: 
The Nation has direct ownership of all minerals 
or substances which either in veins, lodes, masses, 
or beds, constitute deposits the nature of which may 
be distinct from the components of the earth, such 
as ores from which are extracted metals and metaloids 
used in industry; beds of precious stones, rock salt, 
and the salt pans formed directly by seawater; all 
products derived from the decomposition of rocks when 
their exploitation necessitates underground labor; 
all material or organic deposits of materials suscepti-
ble of being used .as fertilizers; all solid mineral 
combustibles; petroleum and all solid liquid, or gaseous 
hydrocarbons. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • the authority of the Nation is inalienable and 
imprescriptible, and concessions may be made only by 
7 
the federal Government to private individuals or civil 
or commercial companies constituted in accordance with 
Mexican laws, with the condition that tney establish 
regular work for the exploitation of the materials 
involved, and comply with the requirements of tne law. 
With regard to petroleum and solid, liquid, or gaseous 
hydrocarbons, no concessions may be granted, and the 
respective regulatory law will determine the for.m in 
which the Nation may carry into effect the exploita-
tion of these products. 
The capacity to acquire ownership of lands and 
waters of the Nation shall be subject to the following 
regulations: 
lat. Only Mexicans by birth or by naturalization 
or Mexican companies have the right to acquire owner-
ship of lands, waters, and their appurtenaces or to 
obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines, 
waters, or combustible minerals in the Mexican Republic. 
The state may concade the same right to aliens provided 
they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to 
consider themselves as nationals with respect to said 
properties and not to invoke the protection of their 
. Governments in reference to same; should they fail to 
respect the agreement, they shall be penalized by 
losing to the benefit o~ the Nation the properties 
they may have acquired. 
8 
The post-revolutionary Mexican government, once it had 
consolidated itself, denounced the outright grants of the Dlaz 
regime as illegal. The government felt that Porfirio D!az did 
not have the right to give away Mexico's natural resources. 
The Mining Laws of 1884, 1892 and 1909 were acts of a dictator 
and therefore the Mexican Republic was not responsible for 
them. 
The oil companies sat uneasy during Mexico's revolu-
tionary period. The first indication of impending trouble 
took place during the r·egime of President Plutarco Ea1as ·Calles. 
Hubert Herring describes the action taken by President Calles 
in the following passage: 
President Calles on December 31, 1924, signed a 
new petroleum law, implementing the 1917 Constitution. 
This law provided for definite national control of the 
oil industry. It reaffirmed the State's ownership of 
subsoil wealth, and authorized exploitation by private 
interests under definite limited concessions from the 
State. 
9 
v~en asked if he had fully understood the consequences 
of his stand President Calles replied, "I have already stated 
that the government over which I preside has meditated the 
consequences of its conduct and that it is ready to fall but 
never to compromise with the forces historically hostile . to 
10 
our Fatherland. n 
This new petroleum law under President Calles was the 
signal for a struggle that was to last until the final expro-
' I priation decree under President Lazaro Cardenas in 193S. 
I Before going into the regime of President Cardenas and the 
final expulsion of the foreign oil companies it would be 
helpful to consider the reactions of Mexican labor and the 
foreign oil concerns. 
world Troubles Affect Mexico 
Vital to an understanding of Mexican labor and .Mexican 
petroleum are two events that occured twenty years before the 
expropriation decree of 1938. No doubt Mexico would have 
taken a different course had it not been for World War I and 
the Russian Revolution. These two events not only plunged 
10 
the world into conflict but also had serious repercussions in 
Mexico. Here we have a case of outside pressure bringing a 
serious problem to a head in a country not involved in t he 
global issue. 
The war changed Mexico's petroleum picture completely 
and she came to the fore as a great producer. Mexicans were 
awaking to t he great econonuc force that lay under their feet. 
The Russian Revolution had an even more profound effect on 
Mexico. Mexican labor had been a radical political force and 
further impetus was given to it by the force of Communism. 
Labor in the petroleum i ndustry had s pecial importance 
because petroleum held a vital place in the national economy 
and therefore in Mexican politics. 
Labor and the Foreign Oil Companies 
Mexico had two major trade union federations. One was 
I 
the C. R.O. M. ( Confederacion Regional Obera Mexicana) which 
was the older group, conservative and similiar to the A.F.of L. 
in t h e United States. The other federation was radical. The 
( . I I ) C.T. M. Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico can be corre-
lated to the C.I.o. 11 The two most important industries, the 
railroads and petroletun, were controlled by the C.T. M. which 
I I later was synonymous with the Lazaro Cardenas government. 
Under the Constitution of 1917 Mexican labor groups had more 
legal rights than any labor group in the vrorld. The Consti-
tution and subsequent legislation called for labor and social 
benefits, an eight hour day, minimum wage law, right to 
organize, the right to strike with police protection for the 
strikers. Provisions for housing for the workers and social 
insurance were also included. 
Mexican labor complained that working conditions in 
foreign-owned industry needed drastic change. No protection 
for the workers had existed until the Federal Labor Law was 
passed. The workers of the oil industry declared that, 
• • • at times actively and others passively, the 
11 
oil companies were evading enforcement of the Labor 
Law. In view of the nature of the work and of the 
physical conditions under which it was performed, 
wages were unjust; the companies failed to furnish 
their workers with adequate housing; in the oil fields, 
the most - elementary requirements of sanitation were 
l~cking, in brief, the treatment the workers receiy~d 
from their employers was not that of human beings. 
Mexican labor pointed out the vast difference in the 
wage scales of the Mexican oil workers compared to those of 
the american oil workers in the United States. As a general 
rule, the Mexican worker was paid an average of one-third the 
american wage rate. This difference in the wage scale was 
unjust~fied, claimed Mexican labor: 
Because of the greater wealth of the Mexican 
subsoil the average production per worker employed 
in the industry i ·s niuch higher in Mexico than in 
the United States. It would be logical to suppose 
that this circumstance should be reflected in higher 
wages for Mexicans than for American workers.l3 
Mexican labor went on to point out that the average 
production per Mexican worker in 1934 was 2350 barrels per 
day, while in the United ~tates it was 750 barrels per 
worker. 
The foreign oil companies, on the other hand, told a 
different story. The companies felt that the charges by 
Mexico were unjustified. They felt that American know-how 
and technology had benefited Mexico. The wages of the 
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petroleum workers were the highest of any Mexican industry. 
William E. McMahon in his work Two_. strikes and Out points out 
that: 
Always the oil business had not only paid its help, 
from top to bottom, better than any other industry in 
Mexico1 but almost fantastically higher than the 
average. Mexican goverrunent statistics, most certainly 
not rigged in favor of the oil companies, alone prove 
that. In the report for 19361 the contrast stood as 
follows: 
Average Wages (in Pesos) 
Petroleum 
Light and Power 
Street Railways 
Mining 
Textiles 
Daily 
7.42 
5.09 
4.55 
4.32 
3.13 
Annual 
2#671.-20 
1#832.40 
1#638.00 
1#555.20 
1,126.80 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Further1 almost alone among Mexican industries they 
furnished free housing, free medical care 1 with 
hospitalization when necessary, for the workers and 
their wives and children; scholarships, good schools, 
playgrounds and sport equipment, company accountants 
calculated that these social benefitf incr·eased the 
basic wage by about ninety per cent. 4 
The companies claimed since 
••• of $3.00 received from Mexican oil 1 $2.00 stayed 
in Mexico, the talk of exploitation of a helpless 
nation by foreign capital can be valued at its real 
worth. Of the remaining ~1.00 the companies had to 
pay expenses in the United states as well as the price 
for purchases of material in the United States.l5 
The foreign concerns felt they were helping Mexico. 
They supplied the technology and Mexico benefited by taxes, 
roads, a better supply for her growing domestic consumption 
and a big stimulus for her newly developing industry. 
The Pirst Sign of Trouble 
i3 
As has already been stated the first sign of trouble in 
the relations between Mexico and the foreign companies arose 
with the passage of the new petroleum law of President Calles. 
The diplomatic wires between washington and :Mexico were hot 
and early in 1927 war was not a remote possibility. The 
United ~tates ambassador to Mexico, Dwight vv . Morrow, and 
President Calles met and an agreement was reached. The issue 
went before the supreme Court of Mexico and Mexico recognized 
oil rights before 1917. 
This did not settle the issue, however, and conditions 
from 1928 to 1935 were trying. The Mexican government, quick 
to respond to public opinion, in 1934 organized an oil 
agency. The aim of this agency was to br.ing the Mexican 
government into the oil business through a public corporation 
and to provide a nucleus for a government oil administration 
if nationalization of the petroleum became necessary. 
I . 
Expropriation Under President Cardenas 
The beginning of the final crisis occurred in November 
I 1936 under the Cardenas government. The oil workers presented 
demands for wage increases and greater social benefits to the 
ll4 
floreign companies. I They were backed by the Cardenas govern-
ment. Negotiations were started and it was not until May o~ 
1937 that the foreign companies agreed to add some 13,000 1 000 
pesos to the workers salaries. The petroleum union held the 
agreement up on the grounds that the amount given was far less 
than the salaries received by United States petroleum workers. 
On May 27, 1937 the workers went on strike. The issue was 
taken before a board of arbitration. 
The demands of the union were a forty hour work week, 
a pension system, eighteen compulsory rest days a year, 
vacations of from twenty-five to sixty days a year depending 
on the length of service, a saving fund, scholarships for 
the workers, an indemnity for workers laid off, medical 
services, pa~Jnent for deaths and accidents on and off the 
job, housing for the workers, etc. The increase the union 
demanded would amount to 1141 611,460 pesos a year.l6 
The companies held that these demands were unreason-
able. Their annual profits were not 16 per cent as the 
petroleum union claimed but 7 per cent. The companies said 
that for many years they had provided free medical and 
hospital facilities for their employees. The union demands 
would mean the companies would not only have to take care 
of the worker but also his family including his grandparents, 
great grandparents, etc. The companies held that with 
vacations, legal holidays, feast days, eto., demanded by the 
~orkers, it would only leave 223 work days out of the year, 
yet the companies would have to pay for the full year. The 
companies considered all possible concessions and presented 
them to the workers.l7 
wnen the findings came from the arbitration commission 
a majority of the union claims were accepted. The companies 
refused to accept the decision. The added costs officially 
came to 26,000,000 pesos annually. The companies said that 
the total costs would came to 41,000,000 pesos and they 
only earned 13,000,000 pesos. The companies filed an 
injunction in the Mexican supreme Court on December 28, 1937. 
This petition was refused. At the last minute President 
I Cardenas tried to get an agreement. The issue now boiled 
down to haggling over how much the companies would pay. 
President C~rdenas promised the costs would not be above 
26, 300,000 pesos annually. The companies were willing to 
settle for 22,500,000 pesos annually. The next offer by 
the companies went to 26,000,000 pesos but on the condition 
that the administrative controls be kept in their hands. 
NO agreement was reached and on March 18, 1938, President 
C~rdenas issued his expropriation decree.l8 The decree 
provided for compensation, under Mexican law, though· . no 
amount was indicated at that time. 
International Repercussions 
The die was cast, Mexico stood on trial before the 
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world. This act of Mexico changed the petroleum picture 
completely. Foreign oil companies began to worry abo4t other 
areas under their control. Tensions over the expropriation 
increased and with war clouds over the Atlantic and Pacific 
the situation was dangerous. The United States had embarked 
on her Good Neighbor Policy and she also stood on trial before 
the other Latin American countries. President F. D. Roosevelt 
showed the good intentions of the United States when he re-
fused to attempt to force Mexico to protect the property of 
the .American compani es. The United States did not deny that 
Mexico had a legal right to expropriate but it did object to 
expropriation which did not adequately compensate the owners. 
Relations between the United States and Mexico were not as 
strained as between Mexico and England. England severed 
diplomatic relations with Mexico. Some writers claim that 
had it not been for the approaching war in Europe and the 
Monroe Doctrine, enforced by the Good Neighbor Policy, 
England may have attempted to use force in Mexico. At any 
rate, all efforts to reach a settlement on a just compensa-
tion failed. 
Public Opinion In Mexico 
W,hen the foreign oil companies were driven out, Mexico 
went on a patriotic spree. During the time the case was 
being negotiated, public opinion in Mexico was at a high 
pitch. The government had pushed the issue so far that the 
public would have resented any settlement. The popular mood 
of the Mexicans can be seen in the following passage by 
Hubert Herring. "One Mexican said to another: 'I hear the 
British are sending a fleet to Tampico.! 1They don't dare,' 
. ' was the reply, •they know President Cardenas will expropri-
ate it. " 119 
A new nationalism was born in Mexico with the expro-
priation. Probably for the first time · in her history Mexico 
was united on one issue. The issue was no longer over 
petroleum but Mexico's desire to face the future by herself. 
The public rallied behind the government, donations kept 
pouring in, women gave their wedding bands for the cause and 
children in the schools contributed their pennies. To round 
out public feeling the Roman Catholic Church, which had been 
practically at war with the government, created a sensation 
by calling for the people to back the government in this 
serious crisis. The general attitude of Mexicans was that 
it would be better to let the oil stay in the ground rather 
than to allow the oil profits to go to foreigners. 
CHAPTER II 
TH.f5 TRANSITION FROM PRIVATE TO PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
Mexico's petroleum problems did not end with national-
ization; on the contrary they just began. In March 1938, when 
the Mexican government expropriated the properties of the 
foreign oil companies, all property and operations, including 
producing, refining, and distribution, were taken over by the 
government corporation "Pemex 11 (PetrJleos Mexicanos). The 
industry was placed in the hands of an Administrative Council 
of Petroleum composed of nine members - six government 
representatives and three representatives of the syndicate 
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of petroleum workers. This agency in itself was a major 
problem in the transition from private to public ownership. 
How Pemex operated will be treated in the next chapter. 
Suffice it to say here that the government was now the em-
ployer, with all the headaches involved in dealing with labor, 
production, distribution, technology, equipment, etc. 
The other main problems faced by the Mexican Govern-
ment, may be summarized as follows: a} boycott of Mexican 
petroleum by the foreign oil companies; b) repercussions on 
the national economy of the boycott; c) increased domestic 
demand for petroleum; d) transportation difficulties; and 
e) international political problems. 
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I I Mexican presidents before Lazaro Cardenas did not feel 
the time was appropriate to expel the foreign oil companies. 
Most of them realized that Mexican nationals were inexperi-
enoed in oil know-how, and would be unable to run the oil 
fields efficiently. Other presidents feared the international 
repercussions of such an act. One thing they all knew would 
happen, and that was certain retaliation by the oil companies. 
The pre-expropriation economy of Mexico was based 
primarily on two extractive industries, mining and petroleum. 
I Before Cardenas, Mexican presidents did not feel that the 
government and economy were strong enough to rely on the 
revenue of mining alone. President cJrdenas however, felt 
that t hen , in 1938, . if .ev.er, was the time to expel the foreign 
companies. Many Mexican nationals working under the tutelage 
of the foreign co~cerns had become experts i.u various branches 
of oil production so that the transition from private to 
public ownership, it was believed, would not be so difficult. 
The Mexican people were solidly behind the government. ln 
I -the international scene, President Cardenas felt that the 
possibilities of war in Europe and Asia would divert foreign 
pressure from Mexico and she would be allowed to solve her 
own difficulties. ' President Cardenas was convinced the 
government and economy were now secure enough to meet any 
emergency. 
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Boycott and Crisis 
Just how much the Mexican, economy would be effected by 
the expulsion of the foreign oil companies became apparent as 
soon as they left. The expropriated oil companies refused to 
buy Mexican oil. The oil companies withdrew their tankers. 
Without tarucers Mexico could not transport her petroleum to 
new markets. Mexico had plenty of oil but no one to buy it. 
The once busy oil ports suffered a temporary decline in 
activity as exports of crude petroleum dropped from 24,560,000 
barrels in 1937 to 8,564,000 barrels in 1938. Mexico no 
longer received the huge amounts of royalties fron1 petroleum 
to balance her foreign exchange. Mexico found herself unable 
to get e"ssential machinery and equipment for her industries:. 
Her credit structure was shaken. 
E:conomic Repercussions 
All phases of the Mexican economy were shaken as a 
result of petroleum nationalization. The tourist trade had 
been increasing every year and was beginning to be a big 
business. The petroleum problem discouraged many American 
and European tourists from visiting Mexico. In 1938 the 
number of tourists dropped to a third of what it had been in 
1937. 21 
Trouble also came to domestic business and industry. 
They were dependent on foreign concerns for goods. Many 
foreign concerns, in sympathy with the oil companies, refused 
'I 
to send goods and equipment. To complete the picture of a 
badly strained economy, the value of the peso dropped from 
twenty-eight cents to less than sixteen cents. With no other 
export to take the place of petroleum, the balance between 
exports and imports was broken. The gold and silver reserves 
reached a low point. In a desperate position, the Mexican 
government issued additional paper money. Mexico started on 
the road to inflation. 
Increase in Domestic Consumption 
Further problems arose because of the increase in 
domestic consumption of petroleum products. Bven before 
nationalization Mexico had been importing refined petroleum 
because of her lack of refineries. Petroleum was shipped out 
crude to the United States and returned refined. This ex-
change was stopped with nationalization and Mexico was left 
without a sufficient amount of high test gasoline, tetroethyl 
and other refined products to meet her domestic needs. The 
new government petroleum agency faced a serious problem i n 
keeping up with domestic needs. 
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Mexico consumed more re~ined gasoline than she pro-
duced. T~is outstripping of production was due to many 
factors such as the development of industry, the rapid motor-
ization of Mexican transportation and the increased use of 
petroleum products as fuel in homes and apartments. The 
Mexican petroleum agency not only had to keep pace with normal 
production but an inc.reasing one. 
Transportation Difficulties 
It was a difficult job to get the petroleum to the 
domestic market. The foreign oil companies had built pipe 
lines from the producing fields to the sea. The whole pipe· 
line network was geared for exports. However, the main 
region of domestic consumption was in the central highland~ 
of Mexico. Thus the government oil agency would have to 
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start from the beginning to build expensive pipe lines over 
rugged terrain. The only way Pemex could g et capital for 
such an expensive undertaking was to export petroleum, but 
with the lack of tankers and the boycott by foreign countries 
very little could be exported. New railroad tankers and tanh. .-
trucks were almost impossible to get even if money was avail-
able for them. 
The following quotation from the Mexican .American 
Review shows that in 1943, five years after nationalization, 
the petroleum transportati on problem was still serious: 
Oil trains were given the right of way over 
passenger trains r ecently in an effort to relieve 
a serious shortage of gasoline and fuel in the 
North Central areas of the Republic. The govern-
ment railway administration ordered the suspension 
of passenger traffic, if nece~sary, to move the 
oil trains in from the coast.:c2 
International Problems 
In international relations Mexico faced great problems. 
The United stat es, the Netherlands and Britain were the chief 
countries that did business with Mexico. Once Mexico 
nationalized her petroleum industry these three countries, 
pushed by the oil companies, put political and economic 
pressure on the Mexican government. 
The British and Dutch had suffered somewhat larger 
losses than the Americans in the expropriation decree of 
1938.23 British and Dutch oil companies put a strict embargo 
on Mexican oil. Both countries had to limit their protests 
of the seizure of their properties to political and economic 
pressures because of the serious crisis in Europe. In 1939 
Britain and Mexico severed diplomatic relations. Tension 
between Mexico, Britain and the Netherlands did not subside 
until t he end of world war II. The embargo of Mexican oil 
by the Dutch and British remained in effect until ~eptember 
15, 1947.24 
one of the results of this pressure by the United 
states, Britain and the Netherlands was to dr.ive Mexico 
to do business with Germany and Japan. The Mexicans were 
forced to sell to anyone. An agreement was made by which 
Germany took Mexican petroleum in exchange for blocked marks 
and German goods. Some of these goods replaced American 
producta.25 An attempt was also made to sell petroleum to 
the Japanese. This plan failed to materialize because the 
export facilities were on the east coast. · With the expense 
of going through the Panama Canal, and the distance from 
I . 
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Japan, the co.st of petroleum would be too high for the 
Japanese oil concerns to make a profit. 
The arrangement between Mexico and Germany caused 
much concern in United States government circles. Conditions 
in Europe were critical and the agreement between Mexico 
and Germany caused uneasiness in the United States. 
The big stumbling block to any attempts at reconcil-
iation between Mexico and the United states was how much the 
American oil co.mpanies were to be paid for the confiscation 
of their property. Four months after Pearl Harbor, o.n 
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April 1942, a settlement was r.eached with most of the 
American oil companies. The United ~tates wanted the 
petroleum controversy out of the way in the interests of 
wartime hemispheric solidarity. An agreement was finally 
reached and the United States oil companies received 
23,995,991 dollars26 for their properties (see Table II. 
Losses ~ Expro£riation !a Mexico).27 
The United states oil companies felt their own 
country had sacrificed them to get better relations with 
Mexico. The biggest bone of contention of the oil companies 
was that the 23,995,991 dollars they received for their 
properties was far from being a just compensation because of 
the tremendous reserves that lay under their lands vh en 
they were forced out of Mexico. The attitude of the oil 
companies can be summed up as follows: "Said one disgruntled 
oil man: 'Lousy is the only word for it. But it was a take-
it-or-leave it proposition, and wartime is no time for big 
business to stand on a peacetime principler.n28 
25 
with the start of world War II and the subsequent entry 
of Mexico on the side of the United states, Mexican petroleum 
problems were by no means solved over night. Her domestic 
consumption was still growing while production remained level. 
The few tankers she was able to get were sunk by German U-boat 
action. With the United States as a partner, Mexico did get 
some badly needed equipment. The United States per.mitted 
' Pemex, the government oil age~cy, to have priority rights on 
a limited amount of equipment for operation and maintenance. 
This was the turning point. It marked the beginning of the 
breakdown of the boycott. The way was open for the recovery 
of Mexico's nationalized oil industry. 
CF...APTER III 
TffE GOVERNMENT TAKE!~ OVER - ADMI NISTRATIVE, 
LABOR AND 11ANAGEMENT PROBLEM~ 
In the post-exprop.ria tion period many problems beset 
the Mexican government. A critical problem involved the re-
lations between labor and the government-operated oil agency 
I 
.Pemex ( Petroleos Mexicanos) • The general nature of t his 
problem will thus be briefly considered first. Other aspects 
of the development of petroleum administrative and management 
policy by the Mexican government best lend themselves to 
chronological treatment and can be divided into three periods: 
a) pre-expropriations; b) Pemex operations up to the end of 
, world war II and its reorganization; and e) Pemex since World 
war II. However, throughout these periods the labor problem 
was always significant. 
Government and Labor 
Once nationalization was established the government was 
face to face with the labor unions. Labor had taken credit 
for the expulsion of the foreign oil companies and it natural-
ly expected to benefit a great deal. Mexican labor borrowed 
from Europe the doctrine that trade unionism must express 
itself in politics. In addition, a prevalent theory of I . 
Mexican trade unionism was based on a principle developed by 
Spanish syndicalism, which held that a fundamental aim of 
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organized labor was for the workers in a given factory or 
industry to own and operate the factory or industry as their 
own. The new government oil agency was thus confronted with a 
politically militant and radical oil workers' union. It might 
have been able to grant the conditions for.merly dermanded by 
the workers fram the foreign oil companies if production had 
stayed at the same level, instead of falling drastically. 
However, with the loss of her world market and chaos in the 
domestic field, the govermnent agency could not keep up with 
the increasing union demands. 
An example of a typical problem the government agency 
faced is the following. A particular operation in the pe-
troleum industry that took two or three American technicians 
now involved about thirty Mexican workers. Most of these men 
were political appointees or labor leaders. None of these 
men had any important technical experience. The total of 
their pay far exceeded that paid to the American technicians.29 
The Mexican agency thus faced the serious problem of political 
influence in an industry that demanded efficient personnel to 
survive. 
Mexican Government Oil Agencies Before Nationalization 
To get a better understanding of the present govern-
~ 
ment oil agency, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), a brief survey 
of the background of Mexican government attempts to enter the 
oil business would be helpful. 
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The first step by Mexico to establish a government oil 
I 
agency came in the regime of President Alvaro Obregon. In 
1923 he reorganized the National Administration of Petroleum 
Control, the agency responsible for implementing government 
policy with respect to petroleum, and set up a new government-
1 owned operating company called 11 Petromex.1130 The aim of 
Petromex was to put the Mexican government into the oil 
business through a public corporation and to provide a nucleus 
for a government oil administration if nationalization of the 
petroleum industry became necessary. 
No new developments or explorations were undertaken by 
this first agency. Petromex confined itself to drilling 
offset wells next to the oil fields of the foreign companies. 
To avoid the expense of exploring new fields Petromex set up 
an oil camp on properties adjacent to an already developed oil 
field and by this means tapped the fields of the foreign 
concerns. This practice was dangerous because very often the 
Mexican government oil camps would be located on the outer 
edge of the oil pool. \'!fells were drilled on this delicate 
edge of the petroleum layer creating a vacuum which would 
allow foreign substances from the outer edge of the well to 
pour in and ruin the well. 
A critical view of the first operations of Mexican oil 
companies is given by William McMahon: 
It is not possible to calculate the millions of 
barrels of oil virtually stolen by this process. • •• 
One can only guess at the value of oil, still lying 
in underground deposits, which these blunderers 
ruined. But this is certain, these 01exica~ Compa-
nies, founded to develop the oil resources of Mexico 
and so add to the national wealth, ·merely whittled 
away the resources and decreased the w~ilth. And at 
that, the venture ended in bankruptcyJ 
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Petromex proved inadequate among other reasons, because 
of its preference for executives with political influence over 
those of proven technical ability. The company was always in 
financial trouble and had a difficult time raising capital for 
operations. Mexican investors were suspicious of Petromex 
because of the uncertainty of the Revolutionary government and 
their lack of faith in the government to deal with the 
techniques of the oil industry. 
By 1937, it was clear that Petromex had failed to 
establish the Mexican government in the oil business. On 
January 30, 1937 the Mexican government established the 
National Petroleum Administration to replace both the National 
Administration of Petroleum Control, the regulartory public 
agency, and Petromex, the government operating company. 
I I • president Lazaro Cardenas' expropriat~on decree came on March 
18, 1938 and on March 21, 1938, under the National Petroleum 
Administration, an Administrative Council of Petroleum was set 
up consisting of six government representatives and three 
representatives of the syndicate of petroleum workers. This 
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administrative council then set up Petroleas Mexicanos (Pemex). 
Mexican petroleum has remained under control of Pemex up to 
the present time.32 
Pemex Operations to the End 0f \i'lorld ~ II 
In 1938 the National Petroleum Administration had no 
money, no skilled technicians, three run down factories and 
about forty dilapidated drilling rigs. In 1950 the reorgan-
ized agency claims it paid over 400,000,000 pesos in taxes to 
the government from its profits. What were the reasons for 
this remarkable recovery? 
Once nationalization was established labor union leaders 
took over key positions in Pemex. The foreign oil companies 
had resisted all attempts to have the labor leaders take over 
these important administrative positions. The foreign 
companies' prediction that management by labor would ruin the 
oil industry seemed to come true when on August 22, 1939 a 
presidential decree reorganized the government petroleum 
industry because of inefficiency. The presidential decree 
took out of eontrol of the labor unions several hundred 
positions of an administrative and technical nature. 33 
The oil industry limped and stalled. It was inevitable 
that the industry would have trouble due to inefficiency, lack 
of equipment and capital, foreign pressure, etc. In March of 
1941 Pemex had further trouble with labor. The petroleum 
administration carried out a drastic reorganization plan in 
the face of stubborn syndicate opposition. Pemex dismissed 
approximately 1,900 oil workers. The employees dismissed 
were those who entered the industry after the 1938 exprop-
riation decree. Pemex ordered the housecleaning to reduce 
operating expenses. Pemex secured the approval of the 
Federal Labor Board to discharge the workers. 
Despite this temporary setback, the petroleum workers 
were still very influential in the Pemex agency. Although 
a few high administrative posts were taken away from the 
labor .leaders in the reorganization of Pemex on August 221 
1939, trade union officials still held many positions of 
importance. Because of its part in the expropriation, the 
petroleum syndicate was one of the strongest unions in 
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Mexico. There were a number of work stoppages during the 
I 
early years of government operations in which the Cardenas and 
Avila Camacho governments did not interfere. Pemex officials 
and union leaders at times made various proposals intended 
to increase production and create harmony in the petroleum 
industry but very often they were at odds on what policy 
to pursue. 
Mexico Enters the World ~ 
When President AVila Camacho took over the government 
on December 1 1 1940 relations between the United States and 
Mexico had begun to improve. The Avila Camacho administration 
cooperated with the United States in setting up a program 
for continental defense in April, 1941. With Mexico and the 
United States drawing closer together, relations between 
Mexico and Germany began to deteriorate.34 
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Under the agreement of April, 1941, Mexico al1owed the 
United states to use its roads, air bases, etc., to ship 
troops and material to the Panama Canal zone. Mexico later 
pledged itself to export essential strategic war materials 
to the United States. The United States reciprocated by 
various means which included: 1) promise to help stabilize 
the peso; 2} allow Pemex to get essential equipment for 
operations; and 3) promise to Pemex of capital and technologi-
cal assistance to build a refinery in Mexico at the end of the 
world crisis. 
Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941 resulted in Mexico's severing diplomatic relations with 
Japan, Germany and Italy in February, 1942· and Mexico, 
"pledged sincere solidarity and coopera1tion in the war that 
has now come to the Americas.u35 
Mexico soon learned the cost of abandoning her 
neutrality when on May 13, 1942 an Axis U-boat sunk the 
6,132 ton tanker Potrero ~Llano. While an ultimatum was 
on its way to Germany over this incident, another Mexican 
tanker was sunk off Cuba. As a result of these two incidents 
President Avila Camacho on June 1, 1942 asked and received 
C-ongressional approval of a declaration that a state of war 
had existed since May 221 1942 between Mexico and the 
Axis powera.36 
There was considerable domestic pressure against this 
declaration of war. The protests subsided when President 
Avila Camacho promised tha. t Mexico would confine l:ier actions 
in the war to the defense of her country and would not have 
to send troops abroad. With these promises, Mexican labor 
backed the government in unifying the home front when, 
"on July1 1942 ••• an over-all-non-strike, non lockout truce 
was signed between representatives of the principle labor 
organizations and industrialists of Mexico, ~suspending' 
capital and labor bickering for the duration of the interna-
tional crisis.n37 The Pemex agency was now assured of 
relatively peaceful labor relations for the duration of the 
war. 
In May1 19431 Efrafn Buenrostro, the head of the 
government petroleum administration, attempted to get a loan 
from the United States to build a much needed refinery. The 
United States and the Mexican government had already settled 
the oil companies claims. The United States agreed to send 
machinery and equipment and also aet up plans for a new high 
octane gas plant in Mexico. 
some equipment and markets were now available but the 
petroleum agency was still badly organized. There was a 
fairly upward trend in production1 but as has already been 
mentioned1 domestic consumption increased every year. New 
fields had to be opened to keep up with demand and refineries 
built. The serious equipment shortages during the war made 
this much needed exploitation and expansion impossible. 
The first eight years of government oil operations 
showed little progress. This period was marked by indecision 
on the part of Pemex officials and technical ignorance 
nevertheless, by the end of world war II production had 
risen slowly. In 1945 Pemex produced 43 1 457,000 barrels 
which was 3,3601 000 barrels less than in 1937, the last 
year of foreign oil production. More encouraging during 
the first eight years was the drilling activity. From 1938 
to 1945 Pemex drilled 258 new wells. Of these forty-five 
were at the rich Poza Rica fields.38 
Pemex Since world War II 
At the end of World War II1 in 19451 Pemex entered 
its most progressive period. One of the first moves of 
President Miguel Alen4n, when he took office in De~_ember 1 
1946 was the appointment of Federal Senator Antonio J. 
I Berra.ude~ as the head of Pemex. A millionaire1 a successf'ul 
business administrator and owner of the Waterfill Frazer 
f 
whisky distillery in Ciudad Juarez 1 he accepted the job of 
running Pemex as a ndollar a year man.n I Although Bermu.de; 
was not a professional oil man he was recognized as one of 
II 
I 
I. 
the most competent executives ever to accept an important 
position in the Mexican government. The degree of progress 
made by Pemex since the war can be attributed directly to 
, 
the business-like manner in which Ber~1dez has conducted the 
affairs of the company.39 
I . 
Bermudez faced a difficult task when he took over in 
December1 1946. Pemex was still full of political appointees 
and much capital was needed for expansion. President 
• Aleman's petroleum plans called for 71 250 new wells which 
would quadruple production. The Qig obstacle was the lack of 
capital for this 61 0001 000 dollar plan. President Ale~n 
faced a political problem because of his need of foreign 
capital to put his plan into effect. 
One stwmbling block could be the attitude of 
ex-President LJzaro cJrdenas who might call this a surrender 
to the foreign companies. Opposition would also come from 
labor's leftist spokesman1 Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The 
cry of foreign imperialism would again arouse the country. 
It would be an easy job to excite the masses who associated 
Standard and Shell with the bombing of Vera Cruz by the 
. I 
United States Navy in 1914. But President Aleman and 
BermJdez took the risk and tried to negociate with independ-
ent American oil companies. These companies 1 which operated 
on a marginal basis, wanted guarantees of long tenure and 
assurance against labor strife.40 It took Berm~dez a few 
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months to get organized but when he did the whole Pemex 
I 
agency and the country knew it. Bermudez obtained the 
union's permission to fire five thousand of the twenty-three 
thousand workers employed by Pemex. The Petroleum Workers 
Syndicate, which was considered Mexico's fastest striking 
I 
union, meekly submitted to Bermudez's action. 
To understand the unions acquiescence to the firing, 
a brief note must be given on the petroleum workers strike 
of December 23,1946. Jorge Ortega, the hot tempered union 
head, called a strike, but this time the government fought 
back. This action by the government, in breaking up the 
strike showed how serious were its plans for the reorganization 
of Pemex. Unlike other disputes between labor and Pemex, 
I 
President Aleman struck back at labor and sent out soldiers 
to break up the strike.4l 
I Bermudez promised more cleaning up in the oil agency. 
This first large scale reorganization by Ber.mJdez allowed 
Pemex to save 4,000,000 pesos from the workers' salaries. 
, 
Bermudez said, nwe have more oil than Venezuela and it is our 
job to get it up. Wben I get through, every man in Pemex 
is going to be on his toes, anxious to win a good record and 
improve the organization. u42 
I Bermudez had made a vigorous start but he still faced 
many difficult problems. In 1937, before expropriation, 
the payroll of the foreign oil companies amounted to 
56,000,000 pesos. In 1941 it went up to 91,000,000 pesos 
I 
under Pemex. Vvhen Bermudez took over in 1946, the payroll 
was over 216,000,000 pesos. The number of workers in the 
oil fields increased from 13,120 in 1937 to 24,726 in 1946. 
These figures should indicate an expanding industry yet 
there was no appreciable increase in production. To make 
the situation serious the production that was achieved 
resulted from the dangerous practice of over-pumping 
existing wells which meant a serious loss of part of the 
reserves. 43 
Relations between Pemex and labor have been much more 
cordial since the government stopped the workers' strike 
of December 1946. The following article taken from the 
New York Journal of Commerce, gives the latest agreement 
between Pemex and the oil workers: 
A new collective c~ntract signed by the 
administration of Petroleos Me.xicanos and the 
National Union of Oil Workers increases the 
total of wages of 22,000 Pemex workers by 
74,000,000 pesos over a period of twenty-four 
months. Th~ ~~ntract will be effective until 
May 31, 1953. 
Despite the lack of funds, trained personnel and 
equipment Pemex has made tremendous progress from 1948 to 
1951. Pemex in 1950 produced 72,117,000 barrels of 
petroleum and when one compares this to the 1942 production 
of 34,815,000 barrels, the increase is remarkable. 45 To get 
a better understanding of these production figures, a cloaer 
view of Mexican petroleum production since nationalization 
will be appropriate. 
CHAPT~R .IV 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTION 
The picture we have seen of the tremendous production 
I 
advance of Pemex under Bermudez was certainly a far cry from 
the dismal years following nationalization. The success of 
the Mexican venture into the oil business hung in the balance 
during those early years of operation. hverything seemed to 
go wrong when the government took over the petroleum industry 
in 1938. To get a better understanding of the production 
problems Pemex faced, it is necessary to go into a more 
detailed analysis of what has happened to production from 
nationalization to the present time. 
When the Mexican government expropriated the foreign 
oil properties, the primary job of Pemex was: 1) to get the 
petroleum out of the ground; and 2) to refine the petroleum. 
This chapter will deal with product.ion of crude petroleum 
and refining capacity. The main products of Mexico's refin-
eries will be discussed in the next chapter. 
As we have noted before, the settlement between Mexico 
and the United Btates in 1942 over compensation for proper-
ties confiscated from the American oil companies, marks the 
turning point of Mexico's venture into the petroleum 
industry. It is convenient then, for our purposes here, to 
divide Mexican petroleum production into two periods; 1) from 
• 
1938 to 1942, and 2) from 1943 to 1951. 
Also to be considered in dealing with the overall 
problem of production are the areas in which this production 
took place. Of all Mexican petroleum production since ex-
propriation, 90 per cent has come from the 1,600 square mile 
Tampico basin area in the northern part of the state of Vera 
Cruz. 46 
Production and Refining Difficulties of the Government 
Petroleum Industry 
40 
The foreign oll companies in their last year in Mexico, 
1937, produced 46,907,000 barrels of crude oil. The new 
Mexican government agency in 1938 produced 38,506,000 barrels. 
This drop in production was inevitable because of the restric-
tions the government agency faced. The main reasons for the 
inability of Pemex to increase crude production of petroleum 
and its refining capacity during those early years of 
operation may be summarized as follows: 1) the loss of 
markets because of reprisals by the expropriated oil compa-
nies; 2) difficulties in replacing worn out machinery; 3) 
lack of tankers to export oil to new markets; 4) lack of 
technicians and oil know-how; 5) political influence in the 
agency; 6) constant labor strife which hampered efficiency; · 
7) world wa:v II and the subsequent loss of the few markets 
Mexico had; and 8) lack of capital for exploration, 
repairing existing refineries and building new refineries to 
.It 
meet the increasing domestic demand. All these problems and 
others will be brought out again when we deal with specific 
periods of production. 
Production of Crude 1938 to 1942 
~~~---- -- ---- -- ----
The discouraging picture of Pemex production during 
this period is revealed in the following table: 
TABLE III 
MEX ICAN CRUDE PRODUCTION FROM 1938 TO 194247 
1937 •••••••• 46#907,000 
1938 •••••••• 38#506#000 
1939 •••••••• 42,898,000 
1940 •••••••• 44,036,000 
1941 •••••••• 42,196,000 
1942 •••••••• 34,815#000 
Exports of crude petroleum dropped from 24,560,000 barrels 
in 1937 to 8,564,000 barrels in 1938, though the main factor 
here was the boycott by the expropriated companies. The 
increase of production that was achieved by Pemex from 1938 
to 1941 resulted from the dangerous practice of over-pumping 
existing wells which meant a serious loss of part of the 
reserves. Add to this the facts that: 1) up to the ex-
propriation the average life of a Mexican well was only 
eight years; and 2) almost no new explorations were under-
taken in the 1938 to 1942 period. Hence the decline in 
1942 reversed the slight upward trend of 1938 to 1941 and 
brought production to a lower level than 1938. The 1942 
production represents the lowest production figure since 
the 34,001,000 barrels in 1933 under foreign oil concerns. 48 
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The beginning of World War II and the entry of Mexico 
on the side of the Allies on June 1 1 1942 at first put the 
Mexican petroleum industry in a perilous position. Mexico 
during the 1938 to 1941 period had developed new markets for 
42 
her petroleum in Europe. During the period between expropri-
ation and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Mexico sent 
65 per cent of her petroleum exports to ~urope. Most of 
this new trade was with Germany. The total of Mexican 
petroleum exports in 1940 was 18,733,000 barrels and in the 
troubled years of 1941 and 1942 petroleum exports dropped 
to 13,744,000 and 6,303,000 barrels respectively. 
Despite these early adversities World War II turned 
out to be the saviour of the Mexican petroleum industry. 
The losses of petroleum exports to ~~rope were partly offset 
by the increase in domestic consumption and the development 
of an important market in Cuba. 49 Another factor which 
helped Mexico was the addition to her maritime transporta-
tion fleet of twelve Axis ships which were seized by the 
government in Mexican harbors in June, -1942 when Mexico 
declared war against Germany, Italy and Japan. 
The turning point in Mexican petroleum production 
came after the low point reached in 1942. As previously 
pointed out, the United States government in the interests 
of wartime hemispheric solidarity, pressed the expropriated 
American oil companies to settle their claims. The United 
43 
States then sent technical experts and some badly needed 
equipment to Mexico. Pemex was given priority rights on a 
limited amount of equipment for operations and maintenance. 
The United States was again available as a market for Mexican 
petroleum. 
Production of Crude 1943 to 1951 
As the following table shows there was a steady up-
ward trend in production beginning with 1943: 
TABLE IV 
MBXICAN CRUDB PRODUCTION 1943 to 195150 
1943 •••••••• 35,163,000 
1944 •••••••• 38,302,000 
1945 •••••••• 43,547,000 
1946 •••••••• 49,235, 000 
1947 •••••••• 56,284,000 
1948 •••••••• 58,508,000 
1949 •••••••• 60,910,000 
1950 •••••••• 72,117,000 
1951 •••••••• 76,000,000* 
*estimated 
Although the United states permitted Pemex to secure 
priority rights on some equipment for operations and mainte-
nance, the government agency still had a difficult time. 
Domestic consumption of refined petroleum in Mexico had 
' increased much more rapidly than the production of crude. 
Crude production increased from 34,815,000 barrels in 1942 
to 35,163,000 barrels in 1943 while domestic consumption 
jumped from 30,123,000 barrels in 1942 to 33,197,000 barrels 
44 
in 1943. Unless new wells were drilled Mexican consumption 
would overtake the production of crude. During the war 
period new explorations were lL11i ted because of shortages 
of essential equipment. Pemex confined its limited explora-
tion program to areas known to be oil-bearing. The cost in 
capital and equipment was too much to attempt the develop-
ment of new areas. 
~vi th the end of tvorld war II in 1945, Mexico's 
petroleum picture was much brighter. From 1947 on, Pemex 
entered its most progressive period of production. From 1945 
to 1951 the production of crude petroleum was nearly doubled. 
The two main factors for this tremendous increase in 
production were: 1) the ability of Pemex to get essential 
equipment at the close of the war; and 2) the reorganiza-
tion of Pemex in December 1946. The change of administration 
has already been discussed. Suffice it to say here that 
many of the man-made difficulties of that agency were solved 
I I by Bermudez. The more farsighted policies of Bermudez made 
for a more favorable situation. 
I I President Aleman and ~enator Bermudez in 1947 for.mu-
lated a six year plan which aimed at quadrupling petroleum 
production. Under this plan 7,250 new wells were to be 
drilled. The chief problem was the need for 6,000,000 
dollars for this exploration project. Help from the United 
states was contemplated but pressure from the expropriated 
'I 
American oil companies and the forces in Mexico hostile to 
the return of American capital in the oil industry both 
combined to check any proposed loan. 
. I 
The only way Bermudez could .get any capital for 
exploration was to deal with independent American oil 
men. These independent oil men wanted guarantees that 
they would not suffer the same fate as the expropriated 
companies in 1938, and assurance against labor troubles. 
I 
Capital and equipment were badly needed but Bermudez in 
his first years had to be cautious. His exploration plans 
had to wait for a more favorable time. 
In 1946 Mexican exports of petroleum were seriously 
curtailed. Crude production had increased approximately 
6,000~000 barrels over the 1945 production figure but in 
the same period domestic demand for petroleum products 
had increased approximately 4,000,000 barrels. This meant 
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a serious curtailment of petroleum for exports. This increase 
in the domestic demand meant that Pemex bad less crude 
petroleum available to earn badly needed foreign currency 
for capital and equipment. 
I In the first year under Bermudez, 1947, Pemex 
increased its production of crude petroleum. Production 
rose from 49,235,000 barrels in 1946 to 56,284,000 barrels 
in 1947. This year marked an important event for Mexico. 
After a nine year controversy, Mexico had finally settled the 
oil expropriation quarrel with Britain. New markets were 
nowavailable for crude petroleum. As a result of the 
increase in production and better relations with England1 
Mexico in 1947 exported 14~508,000 barrels of petroleum. 
This was the highest amount exported by Pemex since 1941. 
The follnwing two years, 1948 and 1949, marked a 
temporary halt in the rapid increase in the production of 
crude petroleum. The following table shows that although 
production incre~sed during 1948 and 1949; it was not as 
much as the 1944 to 1947 period: 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF PRODUCTION FOR THE YEARS 
1~44 TO 1947 AND. 1948 AND 1949 
1944 •••• 38,302,000 •••• +3,139,000 (over previous 
1945 •••• 431547,000 •••• +5,245,000 ( II II 
1946 •••• 49,284,000 •••• +5,737,000 ( If n 
1947 •••• 56,284,000 •••• +7,0001000 { 11 u 
1948 •••• 58,508,000 •••• +2,224,000 ( u n 
1949 •••• 60,910,000 •••• +2,402,000 ( n n 
year) 
II ) 
II ) 
u ) 
u ) 
il ) 
The reasons that the rate of increase in crude 
petroleum production during 1948 and 1949 fell as compared 
with the three previous years was the inability of Pemex 
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to develop new wells. Exploration work was limited because 
of the laek of funds, trained personnel and equipment. When 
Pemex took over the oil fields in 1938 many of them were in 
their infancy. Pemex drained these fields as fast as it 
could and by 1948 and 1949 many of these wells were depleted 
or near depletion. 
I Bermudez realized 1 when he took over the directorship 
of Pemex1 that unless new wells were drilled the production 
of crude petroleum would fall considerably in future years. 
To be able to drill new wells Pemex needed capital and oil 
know-how but neither were available in Mexico. I Bermudez 
had started negotiations with independent American oil men 
but the contracts he was able to secure were limited. Thus 
in order to facilitate new drilling activities1 BermJdez 1 
I 
with the backing of President Aleman qegan to negotiate with 
major oil companies. 
The following passage from Sanford Mosk's work6 
Industrial Revolution in Mexico aptly summarizes the nature 
of the problem faced by President Alemai1 in trying to secure 
new American investments to develop Mexican petroleum 
production: 
The solution he has hit upon for this problem 
is to hire foreign companies to work petroleum re-
sources for the Mexican government, paying them 
for their services in oil rather than in cash. 
This policy began to take shape in 1947. 
. . . . ·• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
In April, 19481 it was announced that a 
contract of this type had been concluded with 
the Cities Services Company. This transaction1 
however1 was a special case because Cities 
Service Company, through a Mexican subsidary, 
still had control of some lands in Northeastern 
Mexico, which had not been subject to expropri-
ation in 1938. Agreements with other American 
oil companies were much more difficult to arrive 
at. In June it was reported that fifteen 
American companies had turned down contracts on 
the ground that the terms offered by PEMEX 
involved too much risk. The company which did the 
drilling, it was point out, would have to bear the 
entire loss if no oil was struck. No further 
arrangements had been concluded by the end of 1948, 
but negotiations were going on all the time, and 
occasionally state:u1ents made on both aides of the 
border suggested that bargaining was bringing 
P~MEX and American oil companies closer together. 
As the year drew to a close, therefore, additional 
contracts for drilling appeared probable.51 
Additional exploration contracts with American oil 
companies did follow. A more detailed account of the return 
of American capital into Mexico's oil industry will be given 
later. Suffice it to say here that the results of the new 
drilling activity involving United States capital became 
apparent in 1950 when the production of crude petroleum was 
increased 12,000,000 barrels over the 1949 production figure. 
The latest estimate of crude production in 1951 shows that 
Pemex will produce approximately 76,000,000 barrels. With 
new exploration plana under way Pemex hopes to expand oil 
production nearly three fold by 1956.52 
I 
48 
Thus, under the directorship of Bermudez, 1947 to 1951, 
Pemex has increased the production of crude petroleum by 65 
' per cent. Although Bermudez has done a remarkable job we 
must take into account the fact that Pemex has not reached 
its present position without the aid of private American 
capital. 53 
Areas of Production 
The operations of Pemex have been frequently pointed 
out as the shining example of a successful government opera-
tion of an oil industry. However, little mention is made of 
the fact that Mexico's production increases have come from 
the properties expropriated in 1938 from foreign oil 
companies. Pemex has not discovered any important fields 
since nationalization. 54 Mention should be made that the 
increased output of petroleum is due entirely to the rich 
Poza Rica field in the Tampico basin of Vera Cruz. 
Only sixteen wells were completed at Poza Rica when 
the expropriation came. This field produced 181 6201 000 
barrels in 19371 the last year of private operations. This 
was a daily average of 51,013 barrels. Intensive drilling 
in this proven area by Pemex has pushed production of crude 
petroleum to an average of 1281 000 barrels per day by 1950. 
This represents a daily increase of 77,000 bar.rels for the 
Poza Rica fields from 1937 to 1950. 55 The following table 
shows the important role played by the Poza Rica fields in 
the total crude production of the Mexican petroleum 
industry: 
49 
TABLE VI 
STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
OF THE PART PLAY~D BY THE POZA RICA FIELD 
IN THE ~lliXICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY56 
Crude Production* 
Year 
Pre-expropriation 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
Expropriation 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
Post-war 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
Total 
34,001 
38,172 
40,241 
41,028 
46,907 
38,506 
42,898 
44,036 
42,196 
34,815 
35,163 
38,302 
43,547 
49,235 
56,284 
58,508 
60,910 
72,117 
* thousands of barrels annually 
Poza Rica 
• • • • • • • • • 
3,772 
10,940 
14,220 
18,620 
22,000 
26,300 
28,350 
25,800 
19,850 
20,540 
21,460 
22,949 
26,213 
31,951 
36,500 
36,660 
46,716 
Other Fields 
34,001 
34,450 
29,751 
26,808 
28,286 
16,506 
16,598 
15,686 
16,396 
14,965 
14,623 
16,743 
20,598 
23,022 
24,333 
22,008 
24,250 
25,401 
With the exception of the newly developed north-
eastern fields 57 Mexican petroleum production has come from 
50 
fields developed by foreign oil companies before 1938. Pemex 
has concentrated its exploration on these proven fields. 
I 
II 
I' 
The following table shows the chief districts of petroleum 
production in Mexico since nationalization: 
TABLE VII 
OIL PRODUCTION OF PEMEX BY DISTRICTt>58 
District 
Isthmus 
Tabasco: 
vera Cruz: 
Northeastern 
Chihuahua: 
Coahuila: 
Tamaulipas : 
Northern 
San Louis Potosi: 
Tamaulipas: 
vera Cruz: 
· poza Rica 
vera. Cruz: 
southern 
Puebla 
vera Cruz 
Year of 
discovery 
1921 
1948 
1901 
1930 
1908 
Crude production 
for 1950 {barrels) 
7#019,834 
624,034 
8,795,444 
46,716,165 
8:,962,121 
Unless Pemex develops new production areas it will 
not be able to maintain its present level of production. 
The estimate of petroleum reserves .of Mexico has increased 
from 950,000,000 barrels to 1,300,000,000 barrels in the 
past five years. Most of this increase has been the result 
. of extensive development of the existing fields. In 1950 
51 
52 
Pemex accelerated its exploratory program and a few potential 
areas have been located. 59 
Refining Capacity of Pemex Since Nationalization 
Production of crude petroleum at first was the main 
problem of Pemex but through the years refining has become 
increasingly important. Petroleum consumption continued to 
expand as new industries were developed and as Mexico in-
creased her transportation facilities. Because of her lack 
of refining facilities Mexico has always been an importer 
of refined petroleum products. 
Although the following statement represents the view 
of standard Oil of New Jersey, the heaviest American loser 
in the expropriation, it goes a long way in explaining the 
difficulties Pemex faced in producing and refining 
petroleum: 
In refining, as in producing Mexico's record 
leaves much to be desired. The operation of oil 
refineries is in itself a highly specialized, 
technical process. It requires not only expert 
management, but also men with extensive practical 
experience. Frequent technical changes _in the 
industry are establishing new ways of producing 
more effi.ciently and are developing new petroleum 
products. Unless refining technique in maintained 
at a high level, the quality of the product is sure 
to decline and will not meet the rigid specifications 
required in many markets. The erection, operation, 
and maintenance of refineries like the development 
of new fields, requi.re large amounts of capital. 
F.requent changes in i.nstallations have to be made to 
keep up with changing methods of refining and of 
producing and utilizing by products.60 
That Pemex would have a difficult time running the 
expropriated refineries efficiently became apparent in the 
early years of operation. The products produced by her 
refineries fell below the minimum requirements for efficient 
use. The gasolin·e and kerosene produced clogged feed lines. 
As Pemex gained experience in refining know-how it was able 
to produce more efficient products but its refineries were 
not developed enough to keep up with the domestic demand 
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of refined products. In the next chapter, which deals with 
petroleum consumption, we will go into more detail on 
:Mexico's dependency on imports of refined petroleum products. 
When Pemex took over the refineries in 1938 it faced 
the following problems: 
1) During the troubled years before expropriation the foreign 
oil companies limited development and repairs to a minimum. 
2) Pemex lacked skilled technicians on the executive and 
development level. 
3) The refineries were run down and equipment was badly 
needed for operations. 
4) Domestic demand of refined products increased y~t Pemex 
had difficulties replacing worn out equipment to get the 
refineries operating, let alone increase capacity. 
5) with reprisals by the foreign oil companies, essential 
equipment was impossible to get. The United ~tates, Britain 
and the Netherlands were the only countries with technical 
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know-how and equipment to help Pemex solve its refining 
problems. 
With the settlement between Mexico and the United 
states in 1942 the future of Pemex•s refining operations 
became encouraging. The hope of increasing refining capacity 
became assured when on July 1, 1943 the United states 
promised to send equipment and machinery to Mexico. The 
United States government also set up plans to facilitate the 
construction of a high-octane plant in Mexico. This plant 
was to be built at the end of the war.61 
The refining capacity of the Pemex-operated plants 
in 1938 was 120,000 barrels a day. In 1941, due to the 
problems already mentioned, refining capacity dropped to 
99,800 barrels a day. By September, 1943 with help from 
the United states, the refining capacity of Pemex plants 
increased to 150,000 per day. 62 
The end of world war II marks the beginning of rapid 
progress for Pemex•s refining operations. Capital and 
equipment were now available. With United ~tates help, an 
181 000,000 dollar refinery was started at Salamanca in the 
state of Guanajuato. 63 This refinery was completed early in 
1950. It has a capacity of 30,000 barrels per day. This 
was the first in Pemex 'a·. plan to build refineries close to 
areas of consumption. During the same period Pemex started 
the renovation and amplification of the refinery at 
Aycapotyalco, on the outskirts of Mexico City. 64 Reconstru-
tion was completed in 1950. The following table shows the 
1951 refineries of Pemex: 
District 
Ce.ntral 
Mexico: 
TABLE VIII 
REFINERIE~ IN ~ffiXICO IN 195165 
Location of 
plant 
Atycapotyalco 
(Mexico City) 
Crude charging 
capacity {barrels 
daily) 
50,000 
Cracking 
capacity 
(barrels 
daily) 
12,800 
Type of 
refinery 
Complete 
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Salamanca 30,000 5,000 Distillation 
I Istl:unus: Minatitlan 24,000 •••••• Distillation 
Northern 
Mexico: Reynosa 4,000 • • • • • • Distillation 
Poza Rica: Poza Rica 4,000 •••••• Skimming 
Tampico: Arbol Grande 22,000 •••••• Skinuning 
Cracking 
Cindad Madero 75,000 4,600 Sk:tmming 
Cracking 
Mata Redonda 15,000 5,800 ::>kimming 
Cracking 
From a low of 99,000 barrels per day in 1941 Pemex has 
upped refining capacity to 282,000 barrels daily in 1951. 
Most of this increase has come wt th the help. of United States 
capital and technology. The refining problems of Pemex have 
by no means been solved. Many new refineries must be built 
to lower the amount of imports of refined products. 
The future prospects of Pemex's refining operations 
depends mainly on its ability to attract additional foreign 
I 
II 
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capital. The revenue received from exports of crude petroleum 
is not significant enough to provide capital for large scale 
expansion in both petroleum production and refining capacity. 
In addition, also train personnel in the latest techniques 
of refining to insure better products and the utilization of 
by-products. 
II 
CHAP'J.1ER V 
P:ETROLEUM CONSUMPTION AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
As we have seen, the production of crude petroleum 
under Pemex has shown remarkable progress. From expropriation 
in 1938 to the present time crude production has increased 
an average of 15 per cent a year, but during the same period 
domestic demand for petroleum products increased 12 per cent 
a year. Domes~ic consumption rose from 24,006,000 barrels 
in 1938 to 59,648,000 barrels in 1950. If domestic demand 
increases at the rate it has in t he past few years Mexico by 
1956 will be consuming some 90,000,000 barrels of petroleum 
products. 66 
Thus Pemex not only has had the problem of getting more 
petroleum for exports, but also that of keeping ahead of the 
domestic demand. This increase in the domestic demand was 
one of the important factors which forced the Pemex leaders 
to seek foreign aid in 1947 for the development of new fields. 
The main reasons for this increase in consumption since 
1938 may be summarized as follows: 1) the rapid industrial-
ization of Mexico especially during and after world iiar II; 
2) the ~ncrease of Mexico's transportation facilities, and 
3) the action by the government in restricting the use of 
wood as fuel. 
Consumption of such refined products as motor fuel, 
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kerosine, lubricating oil, etc., have all risen steadily since 
1938. Because of the increase in the domestic demand Mexico 
has had to import more refined products each year. In 1950 
Mexico imported 7,450,000 barrels as compared to 1,670,000 
barrels in 1938. The increase is considerable, and its 
chief significance is that these imports are costing Mexico 
a great deal of her limited foreign exchange. A big per-
centage of these products are imported from the United ~tates. 
Almost all the petroleum products are those which require an 
elaborate refining process, ana hence are costly. 
The exports and linports of petroleum products have 
been of vital importance to the Mexican economy. Although 
about 60 per cent of the people still make their living from 
the land (according to estimates based on preliminary returns 
of the 1950 census), the economy of Mexico depends to a 
large degree on her extractive industries. The part played 
by petroleum has been of great importance as shown by the 
near collapse of the Mexican economy after expropriation in 
1938. The recent industrial development of Mexico has not 
matured enough as yet to become a decisive factor in the 
Mexican economy. Mexico is under pressure, on the one hand, 
to export petroleum to get essential machinery for develop-
m~lt, and on the other hand to restrict her imports of 
refined products so that foreign exchange will be available 
for vitally needed equipment. 
59 
Domestic Demand and Industrial Development 
Petroleum consumption in Mexiao continued to expand 
as new industries were established. From 1940 to 1944 there 
were three major difficulties hindering industrialization of 
Mexico: 1) impossibility of securing equipment; 2) shortage 
of power; and 3) little or no improvement in transportation, 
involving lack .of motor vehicles, lack of a good highway 
network and of an efficient railroad system. 67 Many of these 
problems have been partially solved today. One of the chief 
reasons for the progress of Mexican industries has been 
Pemex's ability to supply the power needed. 
The impetus for the recent development of industry 
came with world War II. Mexico as many other underdeveloped 
areas, was faced wit h serious shortages during the war. As 
a result, small industries were established overnight. 
Mexico, which was never considered an exporter of manufactured 
goods, made remarkable progress in this respect during this 
period. From 1937 to 1939, of the total of Mexican exports; 
1.5 per cent was in manufactured goods. In 1946 these ex-
ports amoqnted to 34.3 per cent. The chief products involved 
in this great increase were cotton cloth, footwear, and 
beer. 68 During the war Pemex had a difficult time in supply-
ing these new industries. The use of petroleum in industry 
was complicated by high costs in transportation and the 
irregularities of supply. 
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Oil is not only the major current source of power in 
Mexico~ but prospects of petroleum reserves are much brighter 
than any other possible source of power. (See Table IX, 
ENERGY FROM OIL CmiPAR!:!;D TO OTiiliR SOURCEo). 69 There is no 
doubt that Mexico has very large reserves of petroleum. The 
problem is that of exploring new areas to keep her present 
and future industrial establishments running. 
The prospects of using coal for industrial development 
is not as favorable as petroleum. The known utilizable 
deposits are relatively small and are in the north central 
areas of Mexico. The difficulties of transportation to the 
industrial areas of central Mexico makes this a highly 
costly process. The use of wood as fuel for industry will 
be discussed shortly. 
Up to the end of world War II, water power was the 
main source of energy for industry but with the tremendous 
increase of manufacturing during and after the war, water 
power has not been able to keep pace with the growing demand 
for energy. Industries for the most part have had to rely 
on the use of fuel oil. 
I One of the dominant features of the Aleman adminis-
tration has been its stress on the expansion and development 
of industry. Whether Mexico can continue her new industri-
alization program is, of course an open question. The 
answer to this question lies, in part, in the ability of 
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Pemex to supply a sufficient quantity of the required petrole-
um products. 
Correlated with this rapid industrialization has been 
the increase in the use of motor vehicles since 1938. The 
use of trucks and bus transportation has expanded to keep up 
with the industrial development. At the end of \world \1ar II 
Mexico began to improve her t 'ransporta tion system. In 1945 
Mexican vehicles consumed 14, 300,000,000 liters of gasoline. 
In 1949 consumption grew to 1,716,900,000,000 liters. 70 
This increase shows the extent of motorization of the Mexican 
transportation system and the burden placed upon Pemex to 
supply this increasing market. More increases were forth-
coming. From January to May of 1951 Mexico spent 40,000,000 
dollars for imports of motor vehicles a~d parts. This was an 
increase of 23D per cent over the same period in 1950. 71 
This increase places an added burden on Pemex's refineries 
and limits its ability to export more petroleum. 
· ith the increase in the use of motor vehicles in 
:Mexico, the government began the expansion of its highway 
system. Of special importance in Mexico's network of high-
ways is the 1,750 miles of the Pan-American highway. The 
tourist business has been growing steadily. Mexico has 
increased the number of gas filling stations along this 
route. In 1946 there were a total of 1,200 filling stations 
in Mexico. Of this total only two-hundred stations were in 
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the vicinity of Mexico City. Most of the stations were 
situated along the main routes traversed by tourists. 
There has also been a notable increase in the develop-
ment of Mexico's commercial aviation system. The following 
table shows the extent of M~:xico 's rapid progress in air 
transportation: 
TABLE X 
INCREASE OF C OM~RCIAL AVIATION IN MEXICo72 
Year 
1937 
1947 
Miles flown 
3,500,000 
21,400,000 
No. of passengers Mail and 
cargo shipped 
in pounds 
6,800,000 
58,800,000 
Commercial aviation has kept on expanding since the end of 
World war II. The significance of this growth to the Mexican 
petroleum industry is that Pemex has been unable to supply 
high test gasoline for her planes. Most of the high test 
gas is imported from the United ~tates. 
Government Orders Mexicans to Use Petroleum 
During the regime of President Avila Camacho, the 
government ordered landlords to furnish kerosine stoves for 
their tenants, thereby replacing wood burning units. Mexico 
was rapidly denuding her forests. About 80 per cent of the 
lumber cut was used for fuel. President Avila Camacho's 
order served two purposes: 1) relieved the serious 
deforestization of Mexico, and 2) provided a market for 
Pemex's products. 
During the war, petroleum exports were seriously cur-
tailed. The increase in the use of oil as fuel for dwellings 
gave Pemex a market for its surplus petroleum. AS more 
dwellings converted to petroleum fuel for cooking and heat-
ing, the demand for this source of energy grew. 
Thus we have seen that Mexico has gone through a 
profound change in the development of her economy. In almost 
every activity the use of petroleum has been of vital 
importance. 
Pemex Refining Capacity and Data on Increase of Domestic 
Consumption 
The internal consumption of petroleum products 
increased from 39,644,000 barrels in 1946 to 59,648,000 in 
1950. A breakdown of the amount of petroleum consumed by 
Mexico since the expropriation is given in the following 
table: 
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TABLE XI 
DOMESTIC CON.-:.;UMP~'ION OF CRUDE 
PETROLEUM ~INCE NATIONALIZaTION73 
(barrels) 
1938 •••••••• 24,006,000 
1939 ••.••••• 26,095,000 
1940 ••••.••• 27,113,000 
1941 ••.••••• 28,1~9,000 
1942 •••••••• 30,123,000 
1943 •••••••• 33,197,000 
1944 ••••••.• 34,987,000 
1945 ••.••••• 35,495,000 
1946 •••••••• 39,644,000 
1947 ••••••.• 41,623,000 
1948 •••••••• 46,272,000 
1949 •••••••• 56,620,000 
1950., •••.•• 0 59, 648' 000 
*1951 •••.•••• 63,675,000 
i<- (estimated) 
The following breakdown of the four major products 
consumed by Mexico shows the main uses to which domestic 
consumption has been put in the year of expropriation, and 
the significant change which occurred twelve years later: 
TABLE XII 
BREAYU)OWN OF FOUR MAJOR PRODUCT;s CONSUMED BY MEXICO 
(barrels) 
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Year Motor fuel Kerosine Lubricating Residual74 oil fuel oil 
193875 3,000,000 800,000 200,000 12,600,000 
195076 14,925,000 4,500,000 600,000 26,300,000 
Pemex had to pool all its resources to keep up with the 
increasing demand for refined products. Despite serious 
technological and equipment difficulties Pemex has done a 
remarkable job in supplying these domestic needs. In 1942, 
with United States help, the refineries began to produce 
more and more products. The progress made by Pemex since 
1942 can be seen in the following table: 
TABLE XIII 
COMPARISON OF PEI~ IlliFINERY PRODUCTION IN 1942 AHD 1950 
(barrels) 
Year Motor fuel Kerosine Lubricating Residual 
oil fuel oil 
194277 6,786,000 802,107 ?5~,000 22,586,000 
195078 11,843,000 4,489,000 233,000 30,362,000 
The only decline has been in lubricating oil. AS 
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equipment for refining lubricants wore out, Pemex relied more 
and more on the imports of refined lubricants. Refining 
lubricants is a highly complex process requiring a consider-
able amount of capital and technical skill and equipment. 
Because of the stress by Pemex on other pbaaes of the petro-
leum problem, the refining of lubricants therefore suffered 
a decline. 
Before going into the export and import problems of 
Pemex, mention should be made of the new development of 
natural gas in Mexico. 
Mexico Utilizes Natural Gas 
Mexico has a constderable amount of natural gas. Until 
recent times most of the natural gas has gone to waste be-
cause the Pemex pl~nts did not have the facilities to handle 
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it. The first successful exploitation of natural gas came at 
the end of World war II ,when Pemex was able to acquire pipe 
lines and equipment. The largest natural gas plant was at the 
Poza Rica field. It had a capacity of 301 000 1 000 cubic feet 
daily. Due to the lack of facilities to handle more and to 
the absence of a close market 20.,000,000 cubic feet of wet 
gas were being wasted daily. 
Later Pemex was able to get additional equipment to 
enlarge the Poza Rica plant. -.A. new high-pressure gas line 
was constructed from Poza Rica to Mexico City to facilitate 
the use of this natural gas. 79 This pipe line has a capacity 
of 501 000,000 cubic feet daily. The completion of the plant 
at Poza Rica and the pipe line to Mexico City has been an 
important factor in the recent industrial development in 
Mexico City. 
Another significant aspect of this pipe line is that 
the natural gas which had heretofore gone to waste was now 
serving a useful function. A number of p~troleum products 
that had been previously sent to Mexico City at a high cost 
could now be diverted to other areas in Mexico or exported.80 
At the end of ·vvorld War II Pemex began explorations 
for natural gas pools in northeastern Mexico. Up to this 
time large quantities of natural gas were imported from the 
United states. About 50.,000.,000 cubic feet of gas was 
imported daily from Texas. Most of this gas was consumed in 
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the Monterrey district. 81 Pemex hurried explorations in areas 
south of the border because the dollars expended for the 
United states gas were a considerable burden on Mexico's 
balance of payment situation. 
In 1948 a plant for the utilization and distribution 
of natural gas was completed in northern Tamaulipas. The 
important gas wells in this state are at the cities of 
I 82 Camargo, Brasil, Mision, and Reynosa. AS soon as Pemex 
was able to get pipelines these fields took over the areas 
previously supplied from the United states. These gas fields 
have been an important factor in the recent industrial ex -
pansion of the Monterrey area. 
Exports of Petroleum Products 
In ter.ms of Mexico's ability to develop new indus t ries 
and raise the standard of living, Mexico has had to rely to 
a large extent on the exports of minerals. Of all the 
extractive industries, petroleum has had the most profound 
effect on the national economy. From the development of the 
oil fields in 1900 to the expropriation, the t~~ on exports 
of petroleum provided one of the chief sources of income _for 
the Mexican treasury. The effects on the national economy 
of the expropriat ion has already been dealt with. suffice 
it to say that in this respect, even today the effects of the 
expropriation are still evident. 
The peak of Mexican exports were reached in 1922 when 
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180,600,000 barrels were exported. In 1937, the last year of 
foreign oil company operations, exports had declined to 
24,560,000 barrels. The following factors led to a gradual 
decline of exports from 1922 to 1937: 1} the development of 
new oil fields in other countries; 2) the decline of Mexican 
production; and 3) the beginning of a steady rise in domestic 
consumption. In 1938 exports fell to 8,5641 000 barrels as 
cpmpared to the 24,560,000 barrels in 1937, largely because 
of the boycott by the expropriated oil companies. 
The final · settlement with the United states, Britain 
and the Netherlands led to the re-entry of Mexico into the 
world market. Mexico however, then found herself unable to 
export petroleum on the pre-expropriation level for reasons 
already mentioned. It was not until the end of world war II 
that Pemex was able to export a significant quantity of 
petroleum. In 1947 Pemex exported 14,5081 000 barrels of 
petroleum and petroleum products. Of this total, the United 
states imported 69 per cent. Other important markets in that 
year were CUba, 12 per cent, France 4.5 per cent, - est Indies, 
4.3 per cent, Canada, 2.6 per cent, Netherlands 2.6 per 
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cent, and Belgium, 2.5 per cent. As a result of new 
drilling activity, Pemex was able to export 23,3081 000 
barrels in 1950, the highest amount since the government 
took over the petroleum industry. (~ee TABL~ XIV, EXPORTS 
84 OF CRUDE AND REFINED PETROLEUM SINCE 1938) 
The urge for exporting petroleum comes from the real-
ization that Pemex must export as much petroleum as possible 
to earn foreign exchange for the purchase of equipment and 
material needed for development and expansion. Pemex 
announced recently that it was seeking new ma~kets abroad. 
One of the results of this action . was an agreement by which 
Argentina would soon start importing petroleum products 
from Mexico. Negotions are now under way for an agreement 
with Braz11.85 
Imports of Petroleum Products 
The imports of petroleum products have increased 
steadily since the end of \.Y orld War II. The following table 
gives the imports of refined petroleum since 1938: 
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TABLE XV 
IMPORT~ OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SINC~ 193886 
(barrels) 
1937 •••••••• 2,348,000 
1938 •••••••• 1,670,000 
1939 ••• ~····1,382,000 
1940 •••••••• 2,162,000 
1941 •••••••• 2,148,000 
1942 •••••••• 2,572,000 
1943 •••••••• 1,856,000 
1944 •••••••• 2,068,000 
1945 .••••••• 2,429,000 
1946 •••••••• 3,380,000 
1947 •••••••• 4,641,000 
1948 •••••••• 4,685,000 
1949 •••••••• 5,578,000 
1950 •••••••• 7,450,000 
This dependency of Mexico on petroleum imports poses 
the most difficult problem that Pemex faces today. The 
following statement in a United s tates Congressional report 
gives a good example of the problems Pemex must solve: 
~ Although Mexico exported 10,101~000 barrels 
~f crud~ to the United s tates in 1947 and 
imported only 4,641,000 barrels, (pf refined product~ 
Mexico expended some $3,700,000 more in those purchases 
than it received from sales in t he United ~tates. The 
reason is the higher prices of the products imported, 
which are more highly refined items than those 
exported. While Mexico's exports to other countries 
more than made up for the difference and resulted in a 
total export balance on petroleum amounting to 
$4,000,000, the nature ·of Mexico's terms of trade in 
petroleum is of great significance as B~lated to the 
country's balance of payments problem. 
I 
Pemex under Bermudez has made great progress in the 
past six years. With the present troubles in Iran and the 
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increasing world demand, the future of Pemex•s exports seems 
h 
assured. The two problems Pemex must solve are: 1) the 
development of new sources of petroleum for domestic consump-
tion and exports; and 2) the development of new refineries 
to lessen dependency of Pemex on the imports of expensive 
refined products. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CURRENT STATE OF EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEV:t:LOPMENT 
The extraction, refining and distribution of petroleum 
is a complicated business and, as we have seen, Mexico did 
not have competent administrators, technical experts and the 
necessary equipment to operate the oil agency efficiently 
when it nationalized the petroleum industry. The progress 
Pemex has made in recent times has depended to a large ex-
tent on its ability to procure equipment and technical 
advice from the United States. 
The few native administrators and technicians Mexico 
had in 1938 were relegated to minor positions in the Pemex 
agency, because of its preference for men with political 
influence. There were cases of Pemex converting junior 
assistants into superintendents and graduates fresh out of 
engineering school were put in charge of technical opera-
tions, but these men were not only inexperienced, but also 
subject to conflicting orders from the political and union-
led Pemex oligarchy. 
although the foreign oil companies had left a 
gigantic system of pipe lines, refineries, transportation 
lines, distribution stations, tank farms and terminals, the 
Pemex agency faced a terrific transportation problem. As we 
have seen, the whole transportation system established by the 
I 
I 
I 
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foreign oil companies was geared for exports. The petroleum 
fields and refineries were situated on the east coast low-
lands while the main areas of domestic consumption were in 
the central highlands. The inefficiency of Mexico's rail-
roads and motor transportation system often led to scarcities 
in these highland areas. 
Mexico, as an underdeveloped area, was not able to 
produce the essential machinery and equipment needed for 
efficient petroleum operations. Pemex had to depend solely 
on the imports of these articles. Since the settlement of 
the controversy over the expropriated properties, Pemex has 
been able to get more and more tankers, machinery, tank cars, 
pipe lines~ etc. VJith the return of essential petroleum 
equipment, Pemex has been able to progress rapidly in the 
oil business. 
Technical Skills 
v~ e have already seen the effect of political and 
I 
union influence on Pemex up to the beginning of the .aleman 
regime. It was not until BermJdez and President Alemin re-
organized the Pemex agency and rid it of political lame 
ducks and put efficient personnel in their place, that Pemex 
began to show progress. United states technicians were sent 
to Mexico during and after ·world War II to help Pemex solve 
its producing and refining problems. The technological 
progress Pemex has made today is to a considerable extent a 
result of this United states help. Efficient personnel are 
still badly needed by Pemex and one of the major parts of 
BermJdez's development plans is the training of Mexican 
nationals in oil know-how. 
Although we will presently discuss the return of 
American capitol in the oil industry, mention should be 
made that one of the conditions demanded by major oil 
' companies, if they are to return to Mexico, is that they 
retain control of the oil fields they discover so that they 
can regulate production. These iUnerican companies claimed 
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that Pemex technicians pumped the wells too fast, thus 
wasting 30 per cent of the fields' potential output. Before 
spending capital and using scarce materials in Mexico these 
American companies wanted assurances of maximum output. 88 
This example is given to show that although Pemex has made 
some technological progress it is a long way from being 
efficient. 
The Mexican petroleum industry is i n its infancy when 
we compare it to other major producing countries. M:exico 
must train more and more personnel not only for extracting 
and refining petroleum but also in the use of petroleum by-
products. The United States has produced sixteen deriva-
tives from salvaged and converted waste petroleum. Mexico 
not only lacks equipment for such development but also 
specifically trained engineers and technical personne1. 89 
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Bermudez is surrounded by men who have dedicated their 
professional careers to the advancement of Pemex. Pemex has 
been more fortunate in securing more good men on the top 
level than on the operating level. Since 1946 Pemex has 
trained many engineers and technicians but they are small in 
number when one considers the present scope of Pemex's 
operations. 
Transportation Difficulties 
Mexico's mountainous terrain has been one of the most 
important obstacles in Pemex's ability to supply her home 
market. For example, Pemex in 1950 was able to refine 75 per 
cent of domestic requirements for non-aviation gasoline and 
kerosene. At the same time, the major difficulty in supply-
ing Mexico's west coast region was not so much a lack of 
domestic gasoline and kerosene, but the problem of transpor-
tation over the rugged Sierra Ivladre Occidental. As a result, 
the west coast at times suffered serious shortages of fuel 
oil and had to rely on imports from California. 
To relieve this serious situation Pemex has just 
completed {July, 1951) a pipe line which crosses the Isthmus 
I 
of Tehuantepec from Minatitlan on the Gulf of Mexico to the 
Pacific port of Salina Cruz in the state of Oaxaca. 90 It 
is the first interoceanic pipeline in the world. This pipe-
line helps Pemex in two ways: 1) it lessens the dependency 
on high priced American petroleum products; and 2) assures 
the west coast regions of a steady supply of petroleum 
products. 
Pemex has suffered from operating in a country where 
high mountain ranges, lack of surfaced roads and an obsolete 
railroad system make internal distribution d.ifficult • 
. / 
Bermudez realized that Pemex had to rely on the use of pipe 
lines to supply the home market. Although a complete net-
work of pipe lines was left by the foreign oil companies 
these were poorly located. Most of the pipe lines and 
machinery left the the foreign oil companies had been idle 
during the early years of Pemex operations. Because of the 
lowland climate this material rapidly deteriorated. The 
only way Pemex could assure the areas of consumption a 
constant supply of petroleum was to build refineries in 
those areas and pipe lines from the oil fields to the 
refineries. 
Equi£ment Needed 
Along with increasing exploration activities and 
I 
upping refining capacity, Bermudez has begun the job of 
crisscrossing Mexico with pipe lines to overcome distribu-
tion problems. In 1946 Pemex imported 5,062 net tons of 
pipe lines from the United states. From January to October 
of the following year Pemex imported 21,615 net tons. 91 
I This increase of pipe lines during Bermudez's first year as 
director of Pemex, shows the seriousness of his plans to 
?6 
'I 
rel~ mainly on pipe lines rather than motor transportation or 
Mexico's railroads. In the last five years Pemex has laid 
out over one thousand miles of new pipe lines which are 
much more important to Mexico than the nine hundred or so 
miles that were left by the foreign oil companies. 
In the past few years with more and more crude petro-
leum available for exports, Mexico's tanker fleet is 
becoming important. As ~we have seen, the lack of a tanlter 
fleet in 1938 was one of the major reasons for the decline 
in the exports of Mexican petroleum. at the time of 
nationalization Pemex had ·a few coastline vessels and one 
tanker available for navigation on the high seas. With the 
seizure of twelve Axis ships in Mexican harbors, in December, 
1941, the total tonnage of Pemex 1s fleet rose from 17,542 
gross tons in 1938 to 93,966 gross tons when Mexico took 
over the AXis ships. 
In 1950, to aid its increasing export trade, Pemex 
bought six new tankers, five from the United states and one 
from Bpain. Today the Pemex flag waves on no less than 219 
vessels of all kinds, including, according to the Mexican 
,American Review, i'nineteen tankers and converted freighters, 
and thirteen sea going tugs. " I Bermudez reported that Pemex 
ships travelled 196,350 sea miles, carried 24,000,000 
barrels of oil and gasoline, and 150,000 metric tons of 
92 general cargo in 1950. 
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The increase of tank cars and tank trucks during 
I 
President Aleman's administration has also been helpful, 
and has resulted in less periods of shortages in areas 
distant from the pipe lines. The railroad and motor trans-
portation system of Mexico are far from perfect but plans 
are under way for the development of new highways and in-
creased efficiency of the railroad system. 
Exploration Equipment 
Of all the equipment shqrtages the Pemex agency has 
faced, the most serious one, in the long run, is the lack of 
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exploration material. During the troubled years before 1938, 
the foreign oil concerns had ceased all exploration activ-
ities. All servicable drilling machinery was shipped out 
and only obsolete equipment was left behind in 1938. When 
Pemex took over the oil industry all it could show in the 
way of development equipment was forty dilapidated drilling 
rigs and sundry equipment, left by the foreign oil companies. 
some of this equipment could have been made serviceable but 
the Pemex organi~ation, in desperate need of cash, had 
shipped as much of the movable equipment as possible to 
Japan as scrap. 
As we have seen, up to World War II very little ex-
ploration for new fields took place. The need for an 
I 
exploration program became apparent when President Aleman 
reorganized Pemex at the end of 1946 ~ Up to thi.s time Pemex 
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had secured fifty drilling rigs, most of them coming from the 
United States du~ing the war period. vith the stepped up 
I 
exploration program under Bermudez, Pemex now has 117 drill-
ing rigs. The progress made by Pemex since 1946 in securing 
drilling equipment is remarkable when one considers the 
high cost and scarcity of this type of material. 
Although Pemex' s drilling activity has increas.ed in 
the last five years, Mexico is a long way frorn exploring her 
petroleum resources. The United States in 1950 drilled 
43,000 wells of which more than 20,000 were dry. 93 With her 
limited amount of drilling equipment, Pemex was able to 
drill three hundred. wells in 1950, of which ninety were dry. 
A good deal of equipment has been imported during the 
past five years but much more is needed if Pemex is to keep 
up its present rate of production. In January, 1951, Pemex 
was advised to order machinery and equipment needed for 
future development because of the possibilities of shortages 
due to the United States rearmament program. 
The present world troubles threaten to slow down 
Pemex's development program. To ease the possibilities of 
shortages if a third world war follows, Mexico has made 
plans to increase domestic steel production for the manu-
facturing of pipe lines and other petroleum equipment. The 
steel mills of Altos Hornos at Monclavia, in the state of 
Coahuila, and the Fundidoro de Fierro y Acero in the state 
of ~an Luis Potosi are scheduled to expand their facilities 
to meet the needs of Pemex. 
The present order of Pemex for a ~00,000 dollar 
Cardwell drilling rig and 23,500 tons of sixteen inch pipe 
line from the United States Kaiser Steel Company has been 
promised immediate delivery but beyond this order Pemex will 
not be assured any appreciable amount of equipment with 
present world conditions as they are. 94 
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CHAPTER VII 
RETURN OF FOREIGN CAPITAL 
, 
AS soon as President Miguel Aleman took office in 
December, 1946, it became apparent that he was going to take 
drastic measures to increase the efficiency of Pemex. As we 
have seen he attacked the problem in two ways: 1) he 
I 
appointed Bermudez to reorganize Pemex; and 2) he made it 
known that the Mexican petroleum industry would not be ad-
verse to the re-entry of foreign oil companies for explora-
tion and development, with certain limitations. 
I Bermudez was thus given the go-ahead signal by President 
I I Aleman to negotiate with foreign oil companies. Bermudez 
realized that the Pemex lack of capital and its inability to 
take the risks involved in exploring and developing new 
areas for petroleum, was one of the agency's fundamental 
weakness. Hence, he attempted to have this work financed by 
foreign contractors under a percentage-of-production 
arrangement. 
In dealing with the return of foreign capital to the 
Mexican petroleum industry, it is necessary to understand: 
1) the present petroleum laws in Mexico; 2) the terms under 
which foreign capital can ~e-enter Mexico; 3) the response 
of foreign oil companies to the new terms; and 4) the 
popular Mexican attitude toward the re-entry of foreign 
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capital. 
Mexican Legislation and Practice 
we have already discussed article 27 of the 1917 
Mexican Constitution which provided the ·legal authority by 
which Mexico expelled the foreign oil companies in 1938. It 
will be remembered that article 27 stated that all subsoil r ights 
shall be v·ested in the nation1 including such rights as 
direct ownership of minerals, metals, precious stones, petro-
leum, all solid, liquid, or gaseous hydrocarbons, salt and 
solid mineral fuel. In all the minerals cited above, the 
ownership of the Mexican nation is inalienable and imprescrip-
tible and concessions may be granted only by the Federal 
government to private individuals or to civil or commercial 
corporations organized in accordance with Mexican law. 95 
After the foreign oil companies were expelled in 1938 
I I 
article 27 was reinterpreted by Pr.esident Lazaro Cardenas, 
on December 27, 1939, so as to provide that, li in the case of 
petroleum, or solid, liquid, or gaseous hydrocarbons, no 
concessions could be granted and that special laws should 
t ti f t 1-96 govern the exploi a on o such produc s. ' Three days 
I 
after President Cardenas presented this formulation, it was 
made int;o law by the Mexican C1ongress and was called the 
Mexican Petroleum Law of 1939. 
On May 2, 1941 a new petrolemn law was pushed through 
by President Avila Camacho, which varied s"rightly from the 
ll 
petroleum law of 1939. This petroleum law of 1941 is still 
in effect today so that a detailed description of the law is 
essential if we are to understand the legal bases for the 
re-entry of foreign oil companies to Mexico. 
The important articles in the present petroleum law 
of Mexico are as follows: 
Article 1: reaffirms the principle laid down in article 27 
of the constitution of the nation's inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights of all subsoil minerals. 
Article 2: the petroleum industry is subject exclusively 
to Federal jurisdiction. 
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Article 4: the petroleum industry was declared a public 
utility and it had preference over other uses of the soil. 
Provided adequate compensation was given, the Federal govern-
ment could expropriate land for petroleum exploitation. 
article 5: the petroleum industry consists of exploration,. 
exploitation, transportation,. storage, refining, and dis-
tribution of petroleum. 
Article 6: exploration and exploitation could be carried 
out in the following ways: 
a) by direct government operation. 
b) through a public petroleum institution. 
c) through contracts with private individuals 
or corporations. 
Article 10: this article places the following restrictions 
on section 3 of article 6. The contracts must be made with: 
a) Mexican nationals. 
b) companies entirely composed of Mexicans. 
c) mixed companies in which the Federal 
government holds a majority of the 
97 
capital stock. 
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Under this petroleum law of 1941, the Mexican govern-
ment cannot enter into contracts with foreign oil companies 
or Mexican subsidiaries of foreign oil companies. Since this 
law was passed in 1941, the Mexican government has not even 
entered into any contracts with Mexican nationals or 
companies owned by nationals. All exp1oration and exploita-
tion activities in Mexico since 1941 have been carried out 
by the public petroleum institute, Pemex, as provided for 
by article 6, section 2, of the 1941 petroleum law. 
This petroleum law placed several restrictions on 
the public petroleum institute, Pemex. They are as follows: 
Article 19: prohibits Pemex from transferring to a third 
party, rights or obligations given to it. 
Article 47: states that before Pemex can enter into any 
contract with either domestic or foreign oil companies it 
must have prior authorization of the Department of 
~conomics. All companies given contracts are under the 
98 
strict supervision of Pemex. 
It was under article 47 that Pemex found the legal 
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loophole to allow foreign oil companies to re-enter Mexico. 
This provision is interpreted by Pemex as authorizing it to 
enter into contracts with foreign oil companies since article 
10 does not apply to contracts made by Pemex under article 
47 of the petroleum regulations. 
The legality of Pemex's new contracts has not as yet 
been confirmed by law or in court decisions. The question 
is: 
Can Pemex under article 47 legally enter into long-
term contracts which entitle foreign companies to a 
percentage of oil produced from wells drilled by 
them1 and which give the companies a degree of 
managerial control sufficient to protect their 
investment in their exploration and exploitation 
ventures 1 or do such contracts go beyond the limits 
of what is contemplated by that provision of the 
petroleum regulations and violate articles 6 and 
10 of the petroleum law and article 19 of the 
petroleum regulations?99 
The very . fact that there is some doubt of the legality 
of contracts made with Pemex has proved to be one of the 
I 
stumbling blocks in Ber.mudez 1s attempts to attract foreign 
capital to Mexico. Some major oil companies, primarily 
American, are still holding back from entering Mexico because 
of the fear that a future Mexican administration might in-
validate the contracts negotiated by Pemex. 
New Terms for Re-Entry into the :Mexican Petroleum Industry 
' Bermudez issued the following terms under which 
private foreign oil companies could resume petroleum opera-
tions in Mexico: 
1) The private oil companies would be agen.:ts for Pemex and 
could operate only in areas designated by Pemex. These 
companies would undertake geological and geophysical 
exploration and development drill'ing. 
2) If petroleum was discovered the private oil companies 
could act as agents for Pemex or allow Pemex to run the 
100 fields for them. 
3} If petroleum was discovered the foreign oil concerns 
would receive: 
a) 50 per cent of gross production until their 
initial investment was repaid1 plus: 
b) 15 per cent of production from wells drilled 
on land, and/Oir . 
c) 18 per cent of production in tideland areas. 
d) When the initial cost or investment was 
recovered by the foreign oil companies they 
would continue to receive 15 per cent of 
production from the wells drilled on land 
and/or 18 per cent in tideland areas. 101 
4) Contracts are limited to a maximum of thirty years for 
exploitation and three years for exploration, after which 
all permenant installations become the property of the 
Mexican government.l02 
86 
5) No payments were to be made, however, if the foreign oil 
companies failed to discover petroleum. 
among several foreign oil companies interested in 
returning to Mexico~ this last stipulation, that they would 
have to bear the entire loss if no oil was found~ proved to 
be the deciding factor in preventing them from coming to 
terms with Pemex. 
I Although Bermudez has made a few other arrangements 
in attracting foreign capital, these were special cases. ~Ve 
will deal with those contracts presently. Outside of the 
special arrangements, the foreign oil companies presently 
operating in Mexico have all signed contracts agreeing to 
the terms stipulated above by Pemex. 
special Pemex Contracts for Petroleum Development 
I Bermudez in 1947 knew he had to move cautiously in 
bringing back foreign oil companies to Mexico because such 
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actions might cause serious political problems for the 
administration. The first negotiations then were with in-
dependent oil men who were not involved in the expropriation. 
The first contract to be signed with a foreign 
I 
concern came in september, 1947 when Bermudez came to terms 
with Edward Jones~ a minor United states oil promoter. 
Jones was a dealer in oil royalties and he was contracted to 
drill one hundred wells. Jones was to furnish machinery, 
workers~ and pay all the bills. In return the Mexican 
government would reimburse Jones in Mexican government 
bonds for all expenses plus 10 per cent. This first 
adventure by a foreign oil concern was a failure, Actually 
only one old drilling rig was sent to Mexico by Jones. 
The results of this drilling activity by Jones was one well 
completed and it turned out to be dry. ' Meanwhile Bermudez 
had started negotiations for three other 11Jones type " 
contracts with United states oil men but none of these nego-
tiations :rr.aterialized. 103 
The first important contract by Pemex came in April, 
1948, when a contract was signed between the petroleum 
agency and Cities Bervice Company. This contract, however, 
was a special ease because this company, through a Mexican 
subsidiary, still had control of lands in northeastern 
Mexico. The terms of this new contract were that Cities 
service would loan Pemex capital for exploration or develop-
ment; in return Pemex would earmark a portion of any boost 
in production for the American company at below market 
prices. Cities service would lend Pemex 1,000,000 dollars 
annually for ten years at 3 per cent interest. This money 
was to be used for exploring some 1,000,000 virgin acres in 
northeastern Mexico. Although this contract seems to 
favor Pemex, the American company had two hedges: 
1) nearby wells were known to be productive; and 2) Cities 
service coula withdraw from the contract whenever it was 
dissatisfied with operations.l04 
The signing of this contract broke the tension in 
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Mexico over the return of foreign capital. This act did not 
I 
cause any serious political problems. Bermudez now felt he 
could start negotiations with major oil companies and not 
run the risk of a political upheaval. 
In June, 1948, a few months after the Cities Service 
contract was signed, it was reported that fifteen american 
1 
oil companies had turned down contracts with Pemex, on the 
grounds that the terms offered involved too much risk. 
Negotiations were going on all the time as both sides 
attempted to reach an agreement. 105 The American oil 
companies were not adverse to operating in Mexico because of 
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the limited areas available in the United States for explora-
tions. Pemex, on the other hand, needed the ,iUrlerican oil 
companies exploration know-how to insure future petroleum 
production. 
The Mexican american Independent Company ( C.I. M.A.) 
' The first contract undertaken by a f'oreign oil 
company, under the terms of article 47 of the 1941 petroleum 
law, was signed in March, 1949, just eleven years after the 
expropriation. A group of independent American oil operators 
signed a contract with Pemex to undertake geological and 
geophysical exploration and development drilling. The 
operators were the american Independent Oil Company, Signal 
Oil and Gas Company, and Edwin vv. Pauley. Each of these 
groups held 33 1/3 per cent ownership in their operating 
II 
company known as The Mexican American Independent Company, 
(Compa;;.!a Independiente Mexicana - Americana or C.I.M.A. )1°6 
C.I.M.A. began active operations on the Gulf coast 
side of the Isthmus of. Tehuantepec in southeastern Mexico. 
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This area includes both uplands and submerged lands. Drill-
ing activity was started at two places: 1) at Tortuguero, 
- I 
about nineteen miles east o1· Puerto Mexico in the state of 
Vera Cruz; and 2) at Xicalango, near the town of Ciudad del 
Carmen in the state of Campeche.l07 
The Mexican American Independent Company's first 
operations proved very costly. Only five wells were completed, 
costing C.I.M.A. some 3,000,000 dollars. Of these five 
wells, two were nonproductive; two consisted of gas, which 
was useless because of their location in the southern 
Mexican jungles; and one well that was brought in was only 
able to produce two hundred barrels a day. 
This initial setback of C.I.M.A. 1 s operations turned 
out to be so costly and unproductive that Signal Oil and 
Gas Company sold its holdings to Petrofina, a Belguim Oil 
company. Edwin W. Pauly also sold part of his share to the 
American Independent Oil Company. Thus C.I.M.A., at the 
start of its second and more successful explorations, now 
consisted of: 1) American Independent Oil Company, 53 1/3 
per cent; 2) Petrofina, 33 1/3 per cent; and 3) Edwin v. 
Pauley, 13 1/3 per cent. 
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Under the direction of Petrofina and its financial 
backing, the operation is proving to be the most successful 
of any foreign company now in Mexico. In April, 1951, C.I. M.A. 
discovered a new petroleum field in the Tortuguero area of 
vera Cruz. This area is called the Rabtn Grande Oil Field. 
Executives of C.I. M.A. have given the estimate reserves of 
this field at 50,000,000 barrels. George Calleya, the 
general manager of C.I. M.a., said that the splendid co-opera-
tion by Pemex has been the most important factor in their 
successful .operation. 108 
The outstanding feature of developing this new field 
was the small amount of capital needed to complete each well. 
It has cost the reorganized C.I. M.A. company 50,000 dollars 
to bring in each well, which is a sharp contrast to the 
1,000,000 dollar holes sunk by C.I. M.A. in 1950~ 109 
I In July, 1951, the Rabon Grande field was producing 
221 barrels a day and as soon as export facilities are made 
available, the production of this field will be stepped up. 
after suffering its initial loss, C.I. M.A. is optimistic for 
the future. 
Response of Other Foreign Oil Companies 
Negotiations were started early in 1950 between 
BermJdez and the Coo1pagnie Francaise des P;troles. This 
) 
company wanted a percentage-of-production contract like the 
one given to C.I. M.A. The French company offered to invest 
200,000,000 dollars on the .condition that it be allowed to 
take its share of oil production back to France's refineries. 
I Bermudez refused to allow the petroleum to be exported. He 
claimed that Pemex needs the petroleum for its domestic 
market. Pemex wanted to pay the French company its percent-
age of petroleum in cash. 
As yet, no final arrangements have been made. Of any 
I pending deal between Pemex and the French company Bermudez 
said: '1If they want to sign a contract to work in Mexico 
they'll have to accept Pemex's terms. nllO 
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In May, 1951, southeastern Oil Company of Jacksonville, 
Florida announced that it was going to sign an oil drilling 
contract with Pemex. As yet no agreement has been reached. 
southeastern Oil Company plans to drill 150 new wells. 
The other United States oil companies working on a 
percentage-of-production contract with Pemex are relatively 
small. They include: 1) ~harmex, (The Sharpless Oil 
Company of Denver, Colorado) which has drilled two wells, 
both dry holes; and The Isthmus Oil Company of Texas which 
has yet to drill its first well but hopes to drill ten new 
wells and rehabilitate ten old ones. 111 
In september, 1951, Pemex and United States Sinclair 
Oil Company officials met. .although no contract has. been 
signed, the two companies did reach a settlement of Sinclair's 
claims against Pemex for the value of property expropriated 
I• 
, in 1938 from the Char.m Oil Company, a one-time Sinclair sub-
sidiary. The settlement of this dispute opens the door for 
the return of Sinclair to Mexico. If Sinclair does renew 
operations in Mexico, it will be the first major company 
affected by the expropriation to ~eturn to M.exico.ll2 
In terms of increasing the production of crude petro-
leum, the return of foreign capital has not yet affected the 
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Mexican petroleum industry appreciably, What is of importance 
in the return of foreign capital has been its exploration 
activities. Most of the present fields operated by Pemex 
have passed their peak production level. The hope of Mexico's 
future petroleum development depends on the fields developed 
by the returning foreign oil companies. 
Mexican Attitude Toward New Foreign Capital in the Petroleum 
Industry: 
The Mexican people have not forgotten the advantages 
the foreign oil companies had during the Porfirio nlaz regime. 
Since' the expropriation, the nationalized petroleum industry 
has been most sensitive to this public reaction against 
foreign influence. Pemex has had to move slowly and cater 
to public opinion. 
Although the petroleum industry was nationalized in 
1938, the other extractive industries in Mexico were not 
seriously affected by the public's reaction against foreign 
control. The different treatment accorded to one extractive 
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industry among several, may be explained by one of the follow-
ing reasons, or a combination of them. 
1) The psychological aspect of seeing millions of barrels of 
petroleum exported with little or no visible benefits going 
to the Mexican people. 
2) The other extractive industries had put more of their 
profits back into Mexico either by expanding their plants or 
improving conditions of the workers. 
3) The tremendous tracts of land v_;irtually given away by nfaz 
to the petroleum companies, in a land-hungry country like 
Mexico. 
As was to be expected the leaders in the protests 
against the return of foreign capital to the petroleum in-
dustry were the trade unions. Mexico's leading trade union 
federation, C.T.M., which included the oil workers syndicate, 
I ' under its chief spokesman during the Lazaro Cardenas and 
' Avila Camacho regimes, Vincente Lombardo Toledano, warned 
that it would oppose any return of foreign capital to the 
petroleum industry. Lombardo Toledano held that any 
development by foreign oil companies would weaken national 
ovmership and operations in the petroleum industry •113 
, 
Bermudez expected this opposition 9ut the liberal 
terms received by Pemex in its new contracts have temporar-
ily toned down labor's opposition. I Bermudez points out 
that the contracts made by Pemex are much more favorable to 
•. Mexico than those given to any underdeveloped area in the 
world. 114 
Although the major foreign oil companies have not 
I 
rushed to accept the terms ofrered by Pemex, Bermudez feels 
that at the rate of present world production and consumption, 
the foreign oil companies will in time come to Mexico at 
. Pemex's terms. He feels it is a wiser policy to keep the oil 
in the ground rather than let too great a proportion of the 
oil profits go to foreigners. I On the other hand, Bermudez 
95 q 
,, 
realizes the need of new explorations if Mexico is to prosper 
in the oil business. 
CHAPTER VIII 
PF.."''ROLEUM PIELD_S ~ RESERVES A ND EXPLORAT IONS 
Mexico's oil future depends on finding new fields 
which are believed to underlie the country's vast sedimen-
tary basin. These fields must be discovered to ease the 
burden on the present overworked fields. One of the serious 
shortcomings of Pemex has been its failure to develop new 
reserves as rapidly as old reserves were depleted. Next to 
areas in the Middle East and Brazil, Mexico is thought to 
have some of the world's largest and promising unexplored 
areas, which may hold lO,OOO,OOO,OOO barrels of undiscovered 
oil.ll5 
Since the first explorations of oil in 1900, a little 
over seven-thousand wells have been drilled in Mexico. The 
United States in one year alone~ 1950~ drilled 43,000 wells. 
Mexico in 1950 drilled 217 wells. The significant factor 
here is that Mexico is a relatively unexplored area when we 
compare it to the United States. 
The progress made by Pemex in drilling activity, 
' nevertheless, has been notable in the past four years. In 
1946 Pemex completed forty-nine wells as compared to the 
217 wells in 1950. The significance of this development can 
be seen when in January 1, 1946 the estimated proven reserves 
were 870,000,000 barrels as compared to the 1,300,000,000 
barrels in January 1, 1950. With the recent discovery of new 
petroleum fields by Pemex geologists in the states of Vera 
Cruz, Tampaulipas, and Tabasco, the estimates of Mexican 
proven reserves have risen to 1,400,000,000 as of September, 
1951. 116 
Petroleum Reserves 
There are two major oil producing basins in the world. 
They are 1} the Mediterranean and Middle b;ast basin; and 
2) the basin which lies between North America and south 
America, including the Caribbean sea and the Gulf of Mexico. 
Almost all of the world's oil has come from either of these 
two areas. In this second area or basin are located the oil 
deposits of the United states, Venezuela, Mexico and 
b . 117 th Celom ~a. This great basin ranks second amo~g e pe-
troleum provinces of the earth both in proved reserves and in 
promise for future discove-ries. 118 
Of the four major oil producers in this basin, Mexico , 
ranks third to the United States and Venezuela in proven 
reserves. The following table gives the estimated reserves 
of the major petroleum producing countries in this basin: 
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TABLE XVI 
~STIMA.TED PETROLEUM: RESJ!:RVES OF TRB FOUR LE.A.DING PETROL:&;UM 
PRODUCING COUNTRI ES I N THE VuESTERN Hl:!;!viiSPH:&:Rl!: 
Country 
United States 
Venezuela 
Mexico 
Colombia 
AS OF JANUARY 1 1 1951 119 
Estimated proven reserves 
26,217,724,000 
9,500,000,000 2 
1,400,000,000 1 0 
375,000,000 
(barrels) 
Percent of world 
27.54 
9.98 
1.37 
0.39 
The possibilities of developing new oil fields in 
Mexico are great but technical problems have to be overcome 
before an accurate estimate of Mexican reserves are known. 
Oil technicians have stated that there is a considerable 
quanity of petroleum in the shallow-water areas off the Gulf 
coast of Mexico. These areas extend from the fields already 
developed in the Tampico basin and Isthmus area. These oil 
pools are said to extend from thi rty to two hundred miles off-
shore. If the technical problems of operating in waters down 
to six hundred foot depths or even to three hundred feet, can 
be solved these areas will increase Mexico's petroleum proven 
reserves considerably.121 
Another important area which is still relatively un-
explored is the Rio Grande Tertiary basin. This area includes 
I 
the states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, and 
Chihuahua. Geolog ists consider this area a part or a contin-
uation of the United s tates Gulf Coast embayment. Actual 
exploratory and development work has begun in this area but 
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it has been entirely limited to the state of Tamaulipas. One 
o~ the main factors in the increase of estu1ated proven 
reserves has been the development of these fields in north-
eastern Mexico. 122 
Be~ore we go into a discussion of the new oil fields 
developed by Pemex, thus adding to Mexico's proven reserves, 
a description of Pemex's drilling activity since national-
ization would be appropriate. 
Petroleum Exploration 
I 
we have already seen how President Miguel Aleman and 
' Senator Antonio Berxnudez placed a great emphasis on extend-
ing Pemex 1 s exploration program. The results of this 
emphasis on exploration can be seen in the following table: 
TABLE XVII 
WELLS Cill~LETED FROM 1946 TO 1950 AND ~SULTS 1 23 
Year Total Oil Gas Dey 
1946 49 25 2 22 
1947 50 23 2 25 
1948 80 40 3 37 
1949 158 82 14 62 
1950 217 110 47 90 
The 217 wells drilled in 1950 represented the largest 
amount of wells drilled in any one year since 1928. This was 
a remarkable achievement considering the many obstacles Pemex 
had to overcome. It was recently announced in the Mexican 
American Review that from September, 1950, to September, 
1951, Pemex completed 267 wells, of which 145 were productive 
wi t h a potential yield of 62,000 barrels of crude daily plus 
B,lOO,OOO cubic meters of gas.l24 
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Pemex in 1950 had a total of 1,215 producing oil wells. 
The following table shows Mexico's place in the world's total 
of producing wells. .also given is the daily average produc-
tion of each well: 
TABLE XVIII 
PRODUCING OIL WJ!:LLS AND BAILY AVERAGE PRODUCTION 
Pl!:R Wl:!:LL OF MAJOR Pl!:TROLEUM AREAS 125 
Country 
United States 
venezuela 
Mexico 
Peru 
Canada 
Middle East 
Producing oil w.ells 
467,776 
6,915 
1,215 
3,698 
3,469 
343 
(barrels) 
Daily .Average 
production per well 
12.1 
238.6 
173.8 
11.1 
24.1 
. !5, 750.0 
Mexico had about one thousand producing wells in 1934 
and the daily average production per well then was 2350 
barrels. The drop from 2350 barrels a day per well to 173.8 
per day certainly shows the extent of the depletion of her 
existing wells. It will be recalled that most of the produc-
tion achieved by Pemex since 1938 has come from these wells 
located on the fields developed by the foreign oil companies. 
New Oil and Gas Fields in Mexico 
No significant new oil fields were discovered in 
Mexico until 1948 when the northeastern fields in the state 
of Tamaulipas were developed. Other areas developed since 
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1948 are located in the states of Vera Cruz, Tabasco and 
Campeche. 
Tamaulipas 
The main exploration activities of Pemex in north-
eastern Mexico have taken place in the state of Tamaulipas. 
It was here that the first important new area was developed 
by Pemex. The state of Tamaulipas is at present the only 
major oil and gas producing state in the northeastern region 
of Mexico. The fields in this area are as follows: 
Reynosa Field. This field was discovered in February, 
1948 and by April, 1951, had twelve oil wells and fourteen 
gas and distillate wells. Production from the Reynosa field 
is about 1600 barrels of oil, 1500 barrels of distillate 
and 72,000,000 cubic feet of gas daily. Pemex at first held 
high hopes that this field would be a major discovery but 
extended drilling in this field has not resulted in any ap-
preciable increase of crude oi1. 126 
Francisco Cano Field. This field was discovered in 
May, 1949. It is located twenty miles east of Reynosa. 
More exploration drilling is needed before Pemex will know 
the potentiality of this field. As of, April, 1951, it had 
five weils producing 450 barrels of crude daily. 127 
Montern?y Field. This field was discovered in 
December, 1949. It is nine miles southwest of the Reynosa 
field. This area in.April, 1951 was producing 1,400,000 
cubic feet of gas daily and 369 barrels of crude petroleum 
d. ~1 128 a~ Y• 
Brasil Field. This field was discovered in 1948 but 
the field was not developed until late in 1949. It is lo-
cated half way between the Reynosa field and the city of 
Matamoras. Pemex at first sought crude petroleum in this 
area but the field developed into a gas and distillate 
producer. The daily production of this field as of April, 
1951 was 65,000,000 cubic feet of gas and 250 barrels of 
distillates. 129 
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Pe~ex has also developed three other gas and dis-
tillate fields in the state of Tamaulipas: 1) Camargo field 
where it brought in two gas wells out of five wells attempted; 
I . 
2} Mision field which has four gas and distillate wells out 
of eight wells completed; and 3} Valadeces field which has 
one gas and distillate we11. 130 
The following table gives the gas production of 
these fields in 1950: 
TABLE XIX 
GAS PRODUCTION IN THE S'l'ATE OF TAMAULPAB IN 1950 131 
Field 
Brasil 
Camargo 
Cano 1 Mision 
Monterrey 
Reynosa 
(cubic feet) 
Gas production 
83,900,000 
491,500,000 
36,700,000 
2,039,200,000 
43,000,000 
1,309,400,000 
In 1950 these fields produced 624,034 barrels of crude 
petroleum. 
When one considers the potentiality of this area for 
petroleum develop1nent and the small staff of Pemex officials 
in charge of this development one can easily see a main 
obstacle facing Pemex today. This lack of trained personnel 
has limited the development of the northeastern zone. In 
charge of operations of the whole northeastern area are five 
petroleum engineers. Pemex also has three geologists, one 
paleontologist, two mechanical engineers and one production 
foreman. This small staff of technical and supervisory 
132 personnel has set up headquarters at the Reynosa field. 
Although the equipment available for development is 
the best obtainable and allows the use of all the most 
modern techniques, if more was available the present fields 
and the discovery of new fields would be stepped up. Pemex 
now has ten drilling rigs in this district. 133 
vera Cruz 
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I The niost important fields in Vera Cruz are the Panuco 
and Golden Lane. f-lelds. 134 Th d 1 t · th • e new eve opmen s ~n ese 
areas are as follows: 
I Panu.c .o: Fields. Pemex has confined ita development 
in this area to exploiting the existing fields. No sig-
nificant new fields have been discovered in this area. This 
area was developed by the foreign oil companies and has 
produced 820,750,312 barrels of crude petroleum since its 
development in 1901. In 1950 Pemex extracted 8,795,444 
barrels from this field. 
Golden Lane Fields. This area consists of two seper-
ate sections: 1) a string of oil fields which extend due 
south from Lake Tamiahua to approximately thirty miles from 
the Poza Rica fields. No new development has taken place in 
this area; and 2) the Poza Rica fields. 135 The new 
discoveries in the Poza Rica area are: 1) Mecatepec, which 
is located northwest of Poza Rica and now contributes 
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. 25,500 barrels of crude daily; 2) ~scol!n, which is south 
of Poza Rica and yields 22,000 barrels of crude daily; and 
3} the Presidente alewln, which is southeast of Escol!n and 
has an average daily output of 2,000 barrels. 136 The Golden 
Lane fields were discovered by the foreign oil companies in 
1930 and since then have produced 412,066,550 barrels of 
crude petroleum. In 1950 Pemex extracted 46 1 716,165 barrels 
of crude petroleum from .these fields. 
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In the past few years new petroleum fields have been 
discovered near the southern border of Vera Cruz. These 
fields are located on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The new 
I I 
fields are at Tonala, ~1 Burro$ Bl Plan and the Rabon Grande 
fields. This last field was the only field in this group 
that was not developed by Pemex. The only one of these 
fields that is sufficiently developed is El Plan which now 
contributes 14,800 barrels daily. The other fields in this 
area will become good producers as soon as facilities are 
made available to transport the petroleum to refineries.-137 
Most of the fields in this Isthmus area were developed 
by the foreign oil companies in 1908. They have been the 
most productive of all petroleum areas in Mexico.l38 Up to 
1950 these fields gave up 1,102,598,133 barrels of crude 
petroleum. Pemex in 1950 extracted 8,962,121 barrels of 
, crude from this area. 
Tabasco and Campeche 
Exploration activities have been limited in these two 
states. The only significant discovery was announced by 
Pemex in April, 1951 when in the region of Macuspana, 
Tabasco, a new field was discovered. This field has been 
I 
named the Jose Colomo field in honor of Pemex's assistant 
director of production. This field produces 1,900 barrels 
of crude daily a11d as soon as transportation facilities are 
made available this field will be expanded.l39 
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we have already discussed the only significant develop-
ment in the state of Campeche. This field developed by the 
Mexican American Independent Company, C.I. M.A., consists 
mainly of natural gas. Because of its location in the 
southeastern jungles of Mexico it is at the present time of 
very little value. 
It is clear that none of the fields discovered and 
developed by Pemex have been of the caliber of those 
discovered by foreign oil companies prior to 1938. Neverthe-
less, these new fields are significant. They represent a 
step forward by Pemex. As soon as equipment is available 
to increase the productivity of the new fields, Pemex's . 
dependency on the pre-expropriation fields will decrease. 
CHAPT~R IX 
CONCLUSION 
Vfuen .Mexico nationalized the foreign-owned petroleum 
industry in 1938, the country faced tremendous odds. 
Observers properly raised a number of pertinent questions 
concerning the future. ~ould the bureaucracy of an 
underdeveloped country be able to manage a highly complex 
multimillion dollar industry? where would the nationalized 
industry obtain equipment, replacements and technicians 
in the face of the boycott by the expropriated companies? 
How could it export oil without tankers and markets? How 
could the national economy s urvive the loss of foreign 
ex chang e with exports of petroleum shut down? How much 
polit i cal pressure from ~ngland and the United States could 
the Mexican government withstand? These questions have 
now been answered. Mexico has overcome t ne odds. Mexico's 
government-operated petroleum industry is firnuy established, 
and the United states and England have adjusted to the new 
situat ion. 
\~hat factors were mainly responsible in overcoming 
the obstacles which at f irst seemed insurmountable? There 
were two external and four internal factors which were 
' mainly responsible in overcoming the most i mportant obstacles. 
The two external factors were: 1) the Good Neighbor 1 
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foreign policy of the United tltates under which Mexican 
sovereignty was respected in the face of extreme provocation; 
and 2) World War II in which Mexican cooperation, as an ally, 
with the United ~tates and Britain, and strategic--political 
considerations involving the security of the Western 
Hemisphere brought about a settlement between the Mexican 
government and the foreign oil companies. 
The four internal factors were: 1) universal popular 
support, including that of the Roman Catholic church, of the 
Mexican government 1 s action in natiOJ.:.alizing the petroleum 
industry; 2) ability of the government to control the trade 
unions, in particular the Petroleum Workers' Syndicate; 
I 3) unexpected efficient management of Pemex by Bermudez, 
based on competency rather than political influence; and 
4) the channeling of petroleum to the internal market, thus 
assisting industrialization and creating new wealth. 
~·hat have been the results of Pemex's operations? 
Production of crude petroleum, which was 46,907,000 barrels 
in 1937, the last year of foreign operations, dropped to 
38,506,000 barrels in 1938 and further declined to 
34,815,000 barrels in 1942. After the reorganization of 
Pemex in 1947 petroleum production rose until it reached 
72,117,000 barrels in 1950. 
Another important accomplishment of Pemex was its 
ability to increase the total amount of exports of crude and 
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refined petroleum while domestic consumption was increasing. 
In 1937 the foreign oil companies exported 24,560,000 barrels 
of crude and refined petroleum. With the boycott in full 
force, the year 1938 saw Mexican exports drop to 8,564,000 
barrels. The low point was reached in 1944 when 4,9331 000 
barrels left Mexico. Since 1947 Pemex has been able to raise 
its total of petroleum exports and the high point reached in 
1950 when 23,308,000 barrels were exported. 
A significant factor in Pemex•s success has been the 
role of petroleum in the industrialization of Mexico. The 
index of the volume of production of manufacturing industries 
increased from 100 in 1~37 to 148.3 in 1947. Figures are not 
available for the subsequent period but all indications are 
that the rhythm of growth has continued to the present day.l4U 
It cannot be said that the availability of petroleum 
was the decisive factor in the recent development of Mexican 
industry because other factors were involved. Still the 
fact that petroleum was available for domestic consumption 
from 1938 on and could not be exported, had a marked in-
fluence on the increase in industrial development. Something 
bad to be done with the surplus oil and, as a consequence, 
petroleum bec~ae the chief source of power for Mexico's 
industries. 
Although Pemex has made rapid progress in the past 
years it still has many problems to solve, such as the lack 
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of capital, technicians and equipment. Also important in 
restricting Pe:wex 1 a operations has been its continued re-
liance on imports of highly refined petroleum. Despite these 
shortcomings, the major political and economic crisis is 
over. 
New resources for the solution of Pemex's problems can 
be seen on the horizon. Foreign capital is returning to 
Mexico but on different conditions than in the nfaz period. 
These new conditions would not conflict with the aims of 
the nationalization policy based on the Mexican Consititution. 
At the same time, this trend would indicate that the govern-
ment-operated petroleum industry in Ivlexico, as a whole, has 
achieved a recognized stabil i ty. 
Considered from a broader point of view, the experi ence 
of Mexico is not with out' current significance. Mexico was 
once the world's number two petroleum producer. Today her 
position is seventh. Had other conditions prevailed in 
1938, which would have permitted an adjustment between the 
Mexican government and the foreign companies, it is con-
ceivable that under continued ownershi p and management by 
private capital Mexican petroleun1 prouuction would better 
have maintained its pre-eminent world position. 
As for the United States oil companies, the experience 
in Mexico has had its value, even though the lesson was a 
costly one. At the present time, the British oil companies 
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are faced with a similar problem in Iran, and Iran is now 
somewhat in the position of Mexico in 1938. The complexities 
of the lessons of the past and problems of the present are 
well presented in a recent survey by the United States News 
and ·~v orld Report, as follows: 
i~hat these Wnited Statei} companies learned in 
Mexico was how to co-operate with foreign countries 
in developing oil. From concessions that gave 
comparatively little to Mexico and her people, the 
companies turned qui ckly to plans assuring favorable 
returns to other oil-owning nations. Profits are 
split 50-50. Wage and labor policies are more 
liberal. Taxes are paid fully and promptly. Under 
those conditions, production has flourished, with 
little threat of nationalization, in countries such 
as Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. 
British companies, slower to react, now ma.y 
learn in Iran what U.s. companies found out in Mexico. 
And Iran, nationalizing, may draw from Mexico's 
experience a. lesson that oil flows more freely under 
private ma.na.gement.141 
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APPENDIX A 
English Text of Petroleum Expropriation Decree, March 18, 1938 
{!'rom The Mexican b;xpropriation Law (M~xico, D.F.: Editorial 
Polis 1 1938), PP• 56-6~ 
Decree 
Article 1. - The machinery, installations, buildings, 
pipe lines, refineries, storage tanks, stations, means of 
communications, tank cars, distribution stations, vessels, 
and all the other real and personal property of Compan(a 
Mexicana de Petrlleo nEl Aguila, 11 s. A., Companfa Naviera de 
San Crist~bal, ~.A., Compania Naviera San Ricardo, s. A., 
Huasteca Petroleum Company, Sinclair Pierce Oil Company, 
Mexican Sinclair Petroleum Corporation, Btanford y_ Compan.!'a 
sucesores, s. en _Q., Penn Mex Fuel Company, Richmond 
Petroleum Company de MJxico, California Standard Oil Company 
of Mexico, Compan{a Petrolera el Agwi, s. A., Compan!a de 
Gas 1.. Combustible Imperio, Consolidated Oil Company of 
Mexico, Compa1i!a Mexicana de Vapores San Antonio, s. A., 
Sabala Transportation Compan~, Clarita, s . A., and Cacalilao, 
~.A., are hereby expropriated and conveyed to the Government 
on grounds of "public utility,' and insofar as said property 
may be necessary, according to the judgment of t he Department 
of National Economy, for the discovery, extraction, trans-
portation, storage, refinement and distribution of t he 
products of t he petroleum industry. 
j 
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Article 2. - The Department of National Economy, 
, supervised by the Department of Hacienda in its capacity of 
administrator of the property of the Government, shall im-
mediately take possession of the property, object of this 
expropriation, and prosecute the necessary proceedings. 
article 3. - The Department of Hacienda shall pay the 
respective indemnity to the expropriated Companies in ac-
cordance with the provisions of articles 27 of the 
134 
Constitution and 10 and 20 of the ~xpropriation Law in effect, 
and within a period of time not to exceed 10 years. The 
funds therefor shall be taken, by the said Department of 
Hacienda, from a. certain percentage, to be determined later, 
of the petroleum and its by-products, produced by the 
expropriated property, which percentage shall be placed in 
deposit of the Federal Treasury while the case is being 
prosecuted. 
Article 4. - Let personal notice hereof be given to 
the attorneys-in-fact of the expropriated Companies, and 
this decree published in the Federal Diario Oficial. 
This decree shall be in effect as soon as it is 
published in the Federal Diario Oficial. 
Given at the Palace of the Federal Bxecutive of the 
Union, on the eighteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and 
I thirty eight. - The President of the Republic, Lazaro 
_ _ ' cJroenas. - The s e Qretary of Hacienda and Pu bl1c Credit, L 
-- T- =======J·---==-~ 
-=-j------
13 · 
I Eduardo Suarez. - The Secretary of the Department of National 
Economy, Efra!n Buenrostro. (scrolls). 
(Published in the Diario Oficial, 
dated March 19, 1938) 
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APPENDIX B 
Spanish Text of Petroleum Expropriation Decree, March 18, 1938 11 
r: I I 
l£rom The Mexican Expropriation Law (Mexico, D. F.: l!;ditorial 
Polis, 1938), PP• 56-61~ 
Decreto 
Articulo 1~ - Se declaran expropiados por causa de 
I I 
utilidad publica y a favor de la Nacion, la maquinaria, 
1 instalaciones, edificios, oleoductos, refiner!as, tanques, 
de almacenamiento, vlas de communicaci~n, carros taques, 
estaciones de distribuci~n, embaraciones y todos los dem~s 
bienes muebles e inmuebles de propiedad de la Compan!a 
Mexicana de Petr~leo ii~:l Aguila, il S.A. 1 Compan!a Naviera 
de San Crist~bal, s.A., Compah!a Naviera San Ricardo, S·A•, 
Huasteca Petroleum Company, ~inclair Pierce Oil Company, 
Mexican Sinclair Petrol~um Corporation, Sanford y Compa1ifa 
sucesores s. en c., Penn Mex Fuel Company, Richmond 
I Petroleum Company de Mexico, California Standard Oil Company 
of Mexico, Compa~!a Petrolera el Agwi, S.A., Compan!a de 
Gas y Combustible Imperio Consolidated Oil Company of 
I _, 
ii Mexico, Compan~a Mexicana de Vapores San Antonio, S ·A·, 
.Sabalo Transportation Company, Clarita S.A. y Cacalilao, 
~.A., en cuanto sean necesarios, a juicio de la Secretar{a 
de la J£conorn.la Nacional para el descubrimiento, captaci~n, 
conducci&n, almacenamiento, refinacibn y distribuci~n de los 
productos de la industria petrolera. 
==========================-~· 
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1 o 1 .1 Art1culo 2. - La Secretaria de la Economla Nacional, 
con intervenci~n de la secretarfa de Hacienda como 
I I 
administradora de los bienes de la Nacion, procedera a la 
imediata ocupaci~n de los bienes materia de la expropiaci~n 
y a tramitar el expediente respectivo. 
Artfculo 3~ - La ~eeretarfa de Hacienda pagar: la 
indemnizacitn correspondiente a las Compan!as expropiadas, 
de conformidad con lo que disponen los artfculo.s- 27 de la. 
ConstituciJn y 10 y 20 de la Ley Expropiaci6n, en efectivo 
I ,., 
y en un plazo que no excedera de 10 anos. Los fondos para 
hacer el pago los tomar~ la propia Secretarfa de Hacienda 
I 
del tanto por ciento que se determinara posteriormen~de 
la producciJn del petr~leo y sus derivados, que provengan 
I de los bienes expropiados y cuyo producto sera depositado, 
mientras se siguen los trlrnites legales, en la Tesorerfa de 
la Federaci&n. 
0 
Articulo 4. - Notifiquese personalmente a los 
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representantes de las Campan!as expropiadas y publ(quese 
el iiDiario Oficial 11 de la Federacitn. 
en 
~ste Decreto entrar~ en vigor en la fecha de su 
, publicacibn en el uniario Oficial i l de la Federaci6n. 
Dado en el Palacio del Poder Ejecutivo de la Unicin 
a los dieciocho dlas del mes de marzo de mil novecientos 
I I I treinta y ocho. - Lazaro Cardenas. - Rubrica. - :1:!:1 ~ecretario 
de Estado y del Despacho de Hacienda y Credito PJblico, 
=1~--=- ====~~====-~~============~r=--~----
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I I 
Eduardo suarez. - Rubrica. - El Secretario de Estado y del 
Despacho de la Econom!a Nacional, Efra!n Buenrostro - R~brica. i 
(Publicado en el "Diario Oficial 11 de 19 de Marzo de 1938.} 
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AB~THACT 
The first successful cow~ercial exploitation of 
Mexican petroleum took place during the last decade of 
Porfirio Dlaz 1 s regime (1900-1910). Favorable concessions 
were given to British and American oil companies. Under these 
conditions, Mexico by 1921 had become the world's second 
largest oil producing country. 
The Revolution of 1910-1920 brought about profound 
changes in Mexico. There emerged a highly nationalistic 
orientation toward subsoil wealth. As a result, Article 27 
of the 1917 Constitution vested ownership and control of 
mineral and petroleum deposits in the nation. In addition, 
there arose in post-Revolutionary Mexico a strong labor 
movement generally backed by the government. Under these 
new conditions, friction developed between the labor move-
ment a:ud Mexicau governm6nt, on the oue hand, and the 
foreign petroleum companies on the other, leading to the 
expropriation of the oil companies by the Mexican government 
on March 18, 1938 • 
.after nationalizing the petroleum industry and setting 
up Petrlleos Mexicanos (Pemex) as the government operating 
agency, Mexico was confronted with a number of critical 
proble..:ils, including a boycott by tne expropriated oil 
COlilpanies, inter.L.Latio:ual political pressure, depreciation 
li 
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of currency and great deficiencies in transportation, 
cal equipment and managerial competence. ( In addition, Pemex .! 
the new employer of the petroleum workers, was plagued with 
labor problems. 
In 1942, with Mexico joining in the war against the 
Axis powers, a settlement was reached between the Mexican 
and United states governments over compensation for the 
expropriated oil companies, and the Mexican petroleum indus-
try began slowly to recover. 
In . December 1946, Pemex was reorganized by President 
AlemJn. He appointed Senator BermJdez as director of Pemex. 
The degree of progress made by Pemex since December, 1946 
can be largely attributed to the business-like manner in 
which Berm~dez has managed the affairs of the company. 
Productlon and refining difficulties at first seemed 
insurmountable for the governme.u.t petroleum agency. The 
foreign oil companies in 1937, their last year in Mexico, 
produced 46,907,000 barrels or crude petrolewn. Pemex in 
1938 produced 38,506,000 barrels and production of crude 
further declined to 34,815,000 barrels in 1942. With 
Mexico's entry into the war in 1942, badly needed equipment 
and technicia1.~.s were sent to Mexico. Production began to 
rise and by 1950 Pemex produced 72,117,000 barrels of crude 
petroleum. 
The refining output of Pemex's plants followed the 
I 
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S8.l11e pattern as the production of crude, From a low of 
99,000 barrels daily of refined petroleum in 1941, Pemex has 
upped capacity to 282,000 barrels daily in 1950. 
Domestic demand for refined petroleum has risen 
steadily in Mexico, jumping from 24,006,000 barrels in 1938 
to 59,648,000 barrels in 1950. An important factor in this 
increase was the new demand for fuel caused by the rapid 
growth of Mexican industry and the accompanying development 
of motorized transport. 
Despite the fact domestic co ... lswnption has increased 
an aver·age of 1~ per cent a year since 1938, the production 
of crude has increased 15 per cent per annum on the average. 
This has allowed Pemex to export more and more petroleum 
each year. From a low of 4,933,000 barrels exported in 
1944, Pemex in 1950 exported 23,308,000 barrels. 
Not as promising for Mexico's foreign exchange 
situation has been the rapid increase of imports of h~ghly 
refined petroleum. In 1938 Mexico imported 1,670,000 
barrels of refined petroleum. In 1950 Pemex imported 
7,450,000 barrels. 
The exploration and development o1' new oil fields 
is a costly undertaking. I President Aleman, realizing that 
Pemex neither had the capital nor the technical resources 
for this development, gave Berm~dez authority to negotiate 
with foreign oil companies for exploration and development 
~new oil fields. The new terms under which fore i gn oil 
'i companies are allowed to re-enter Mexico provide financial 
147 
compensation on the bas i s of p ercentage of' product i on rather 
II ! l1 than outright ownership as in the D az period. Some American 
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oil companies have returned to Mexico, but there is still 
general reluctance on the part of fore i gn capital because of 
the uncertainty of the legality of the contracts and re-
sentment at what happened in 1938. 
In terms of increasing production of crude petroleum, 
the limited return of foreign capital has not yet affected 
the Mexican petroleum industry. It has, however, stepped 
up exploration activities ·which may assure Perr1ex of future 
oil .fields. Thus, the estimated petroleum reserves of 
to 1,400,000,000 barrels as of September, 1951. There has 
also been an increase in the development of new wells. In 
1943 only sixteen new wells were completed. Since that time 
Pemex's exploration activities have increased and in 1950, 
217 new wells were completed. The results of this drilling 
activity can be seen in the new oil and gas f i elds op ened 
up in the states of Tamaulipas, Vera Cruz, Tabasco and 
Campeche . 
·~-vhen Mexl.co nationalized the foreign-owned petroleum 
industry in 1938, the country faced tremendous odds. These 
I 
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odds have been to a certain extent overcome and t h e Mexican I 
government-operated petruleum industry is firmly established. I 
New resources for the solution of Pemex's problems can be 
seen on the horizon with the retur.u of foreign capital to 
Mexico. 
considered from a broader point of view, t h e experi-
ence of Mexico shows that although Pemex·has made much prog-
ress, had the Mexican government __ and the foreign oil 
companies settled their differences in 1938, Mexico today 
would probably be i n a much better position as a leading 
world producer of petroleum. 
